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ABSTRACT. Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides 
that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract.”  In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, a sharply 
divided Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted a California uncon-
scionability rule that effectively guaranteed plaintiffs the right to class 
action arbitrations.  A controversial decision, Concepcion has left courts 
and litigants uncertain about whether longstanding state and federal 
regulations on the arbitration process remain viable.  To take but a few 
examples, may the drafter of an adhesive contract have limitless discre-
tion to select the arbitrators unilaterally, or eliminate all of a plaintiff's 
rights to discovery?  State and federal courts have traditionally not per-
mitted such behavior.  But to date there has been no systematic analysis 
of the impact of the Concepcion Court’s expansive reasoning on such 
regulations. 
  
This Article fills that void.  We argue that Concepcion has entrenched, 
and in many ways rewritten, the fundamental principles of arbitration 
jurisprudence.  What made Concepcion a bellwether was not its narrow 
holding on class actions, but rather its unprecedented analysis of when 
and how the FAA trumps other laws.  In earlier opinions, the Court had 
suggested that the FAA would trump rules that were not “generally ap-
plicable” but instead were applied to discriminate against arbitra-
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tion.  But in Concepcion, the Court devised a new test that held that the 
California rule was preempted because it conflicted with the “fundamen-
tal attributes of arbitration”—informality, efficiency, reduced costs, and 
speed. 
  
We argue that the Court’s newly-minted preemption analysis, based on 
abstractions about arbitration’s “fundamental attributes,” threatens to 
jeopardize a bevy of facially neutral contract laws as they are applied to 
arbitration agreements.  In formalizing what arbitration is and why it is 
important, Concepcion has upended decades of statutory and common 
law that may interfere with arbitration’s “fundamental attributes.”  The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Express v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant has only confirmed that many restrictions on arbitration, 
whether based in state or federal law, may now be susceptible to 
preemption challenges.  This Article describes how the Court arrived 
upon this precipice, shows how going over—
taking Concepcion’s reasoning to its logical conclusion—disrupts a 
longstanding body of law, and discusses the future of arbitration regula-
tions following the post-Concepcion cliff. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans routinely sign standard form contracts that include arbi-
tration clauses.
1
  The drafters, repeat institutional players like large busi-
nesses and employers, face significant exposure to litigation and prefer 
arbitration for a multitude of reasons, including informality and efficien-
cy.
2
  But a natural question emerges from a drafter’s unilateral control 
                                                          
 1.  A 2008 study, for example, concluded that seventy-five percent of consumer contracts that 
the authors studied, including those of Fortune 100 telecommunications, credit, and financial ser-
vices companies, contained mandatory arbitration clauses.  Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s 
Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Con-
tracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882–83 (2008).  By contrast, a study just ten years earlier 
showed that only 17.4 percent of consumer rights disputes were resolved by arbitration.  DAVID P. 
LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A RE-
PORT ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS 11 (1998), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=icrpubs. 
 2.  See, e.g., LIPSKY & SEEBER, supra note 1, at 17 (finding speed and cost-savings were the 
top two reasons Fortune 100 companies chose arbitration and mediation); Will Pryor, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 61 SMU L. REV. 519, 522 (2008) (writing that, in the 1980s, “[p]roduct manu-
facturers, homebuilders, banks, insurers, employers, landlords, and in short, anyone with a concern 
that litigation was just too expensive and too inefficient, began to turn to arbitration as a means of 
controlling litigation costs and limiting exposure”); Michael Satz, Mandatory Binding Arbitration: 
Our Legal History Demands Balanced Reform, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 19, 34 (2007) (stating that “the 
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over a contract’s terms: just how one-sided can these arbitration agree-
ments be?  What limits—if any—can state and federal law impose on the 
arbitration process? 
Consider the case of Annette Phillips, a bartender at a Hooters res-
taurant in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.  Claiming that she was the vic-
tim of sexual harassment, Phillips sued Hooters under the federal labor 
laws.
3
  However, Phillips had unwittingly signed an arbitration agree-




Hooters had drafted an arbitration agreement that gave itself virtually 
unconstrained power over every facet of the arbitration.  For instance, 
Hooters enjoyed limitless discretion over the pool of potential arbitra-
tors—only those pre-approved by Hooters could hear Phillips’s claim, 
and Hooters could even limit the pool to those with financial or family 
ties to the company.
5
  The Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution 
said that “[i]t would be hard to imagine a more unfair method of select-
ing a panel of arbitrators.”
6
  Nor did the arbitration agreement contain 
any hint of reciprocity.
7
  Hooters alone had the power to move for sum-
mary dismissal or to vacate an arbitration award.  Phillips had no such 
rights.
8
  By contrast, Phillips was required to provide exacting notice of 
her legal claims, factual allegations, and witnesses, while Hooters had no 
such obligations.  And, as if those terms were not egregious enough, 
Hooters could modify the foregoing rules at any time—without prior no-
tice.
9
  Fortunately for Phillips, a unanimous Fourth Circuit panel struck 




Although courts—like the Fourth Circuit in Hooters—have refused 
to enforce certain arbitration agreements, their authority to do so is lim-
ited by federal law.  Notably, Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
                                                          
two primary benefits” for arbitration of consumer disputes are “limited exposure to risk” and “im-
proved efficiency”). 
 3.  Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 4.  Id. at 936. 
 5.  Id. at 939. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 938. 
 8.  Id. at 939. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 935. 
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the revocation of any contract.”
11
  This is the “primary substantive provi-
sion” of the FAA.
12
 
The FAA preempts conflicting state laws, whether passed by a legis-
lature or given effect by a state court.
13
  This is a principle upon which 
all can agree.  For some time, the Supreme Court did not have an estab-
lished analytical framework to govern potential conflicts between state 
laws and the FAA.  The Court eventually settled on “obstacle preemp-
tion” as its mode of analysis, asking at the broadest level whether a chal-
lenged state law ‘“interferes with the methods by which the federal stat-
ute was designed to reach [its] goal.’”
14
 
In past FAA preemption decisions, the Court suggested that a state 
law would be preempted by the FAA if it (1) prohibited arbitration out-
right,
15
 (2) targeted arbitration agreements for suspect treatment,
16
 or (3) 
interfered with the FAA’s purposes.
17
  But the Court’s opinions offered 
divergent explications of those purposes.  The Court has written that 
“[t]he FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter 
of contract.”
18
  Elsewhere, the Court explained that the FAA reflected “a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”
19
  On other occa-
sions, the Court indicated that Congress intended for Section 2 to “re-
verse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that 
had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American 
courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as oth-
er contracts.”
20
  Finally, the Court recently mentioned, but never thor-
oughly articulated, the theory that the FAA was intended to promote a 
quick and efficient resolution of private disputes.
21
 
                                                          
 11.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  
 12.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).  
 13.  See infra Part I.A.1.a. 
 14.  Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 103 (1992) (quoting Int’l Paper Co. 
v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987)) (noting that generally courts preempt state laws that interfere 
with the purposes and goals of federal laws).   
 15.  See infra Part I.A.1.a. 
 16.  See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1012 (Winter 1996) (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)) (“Any law that singles out arbitration agreements by making 
them less enforceable than other contracts is preempted by the FAA.”); see infra Part I.A.1.b. 
 17.  See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008); see infra Part I.A.1.c. 
 18.  Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010). 
 19.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 20.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). 
 21.  See Preston, 552 U.S. at 353 (noting that “Congress[ional] intent [was] ‘to move the parties 
to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible’” and that 
“[a] prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to achieve ‘streamlined proceedings and expedi-
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Built into this multi-pronged analysis was the flexibility to allow 
lower courts to invalidate a number of statutory and common law regula-
tions on arbitration that improperly curtailed arbitration, while applying 
generally applicable laws to protect draftees from arbitration agreements 
that violate longstanding public policies.  Thus, courts calibrated 
preemption doctrine to try to balance between a federal pro-arbitration 
policy with the policy of nondiscriminatory state laws intended to ensure 
procedural fairness. 
But that precarious balance may be at an end.  In AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion,
22
 a sharply divided Supreme Court held that the 
FAA preempted a California common law rule that effectively guaran-
teed the right to class action arbitration (the Discover Bank rule).
23
  In 
Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court held that certain arbitration 
agreements waiving class action arbitrations were unconscionable under 
state law,
24
 after which the California courts frequently invalidated waiv-
ers of class action arbitrations.
25
  The Concepcion majority held that the 
FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule because it stood as an obstacle to 
the pro-arbitration purposes of the FAA.
26
  A deeply controversial opin-
ion,
27
 Concepcion has rekindled familiar debates on the merits of class 
                                                          
tious results’”). 
 22.  131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).   
 23.  See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).  
 24.  See id. (invalidating waivers of class action arbitration that provided the party with superior 
bargaining power an exemption “‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the per-
son or property of another’”). 
 25.  See, e.g., Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1446 (2006) (declaring an 
arbitration agreement unconscionable “under principles announced in Discover Bank”). 
 26.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 27.  For criticisms of Concepcion, see Megan Barnett, Comment, There is Still Hope for the 
Little Guy: Unconscionability is Still a Defense Against Arbitration Clauses Despite AT&T Mobility 
v. Concepcion, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 651 (2012) (generally pointing out how plaintiffs can still use 
unconscionability to get out of a contract’s arbitration terms); David Horton, Unconscionability 
Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 390 (2012) (arguing, among other things, that the “anti-court theory,” 
as espoused in Concepcion, “is impossible to square with the FAA”).  For a thoughtful analysis of 
the impact of Concepcion and lower courts’ interpretations of that decision to class proceedings, see 
Jean Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. 
REV. 703, 727 (2012) (arguing that Concepcion “has caused a tsunami wave that is threatening to 
eliminate many consumers’ and employees’ abilities to enforce their substantive rights by participat-
ing in class actions”).  For other discussions of Concepcion, see generally David Horton, Federal 
Arbitration Act Preemption: Purposivism and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217 (2013) (dis-
cussing the impact of Concepcion on FAA preemption analysis) [hereinafter Horton, Federal Arbi-
tration Act Preemption]; Hiro Aragaki, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and the Antidiscrimina-
tion Theory of Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 4 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 39 (2013) 
(discussing the potential implications of the majority’s reasoning in Concepcion); Myriam Gilles & 
Gary Friedman, After Class: Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 623 (2012) (discussing Concepcion’s impact on the tradition of private involvement in the en-
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actions and the desirability of consumer arbitration.
28
 
Courts are fractured about how expansively to read Concepcion.
29
  
And as courts struggle to determine an elusive limit to its reasoning, to 
date there has been no systematic analysis of the decision’s proximate 
impact on the myriad of longstanding state and federal regulations that 
affect the arbitration process.  This Article fills that void.  We argue that 
Concepcion has entrenched—and in many ways rewritten—the funda-
mental principles of arbitration jurisprudence. Concepcion has had and 
will continue to have a revolutionary effect on the continuing viability of 
state and federal arbitration regulations. 
What made Concepcion a bellwether was not its narrow holding re-
garding the viability of class action arbitrations, but rather its unprece-
dented analysis of when and how the FAA trumps other laws.  Concep-
cion devised a new test under which the FAA preempted the California 
rule because it conflicted with the “fundamental attributes of arbitration”: 
informality, efficiency, reduced costs, and speed.
30
  We argue that the 
Supreme Court’s newly-minted preemption analysis, based on abstrac-
tions about arbitration’s essential purposes, threatens to jeopardize a 
bevy of facially neutral contract laws as they are applied to arbitration 
agreements.  And although courts initially tried to discern a bright-line 
limiting principle to Concepcion’s reasoning, just this term the Supreme 
Court provided a resounding affirmation of Concepcion’s expansive 
reach in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.
31
  In formal-
izing what arbitration is and why it is important, Concepcion has upend-
ed decades of statutory and common law. 
This Article shows how, and it does so in three parts.  Part I discuss-
es how the FAA previously coexisted with state and federal regulations 
and describes how Concepcion marks a significant break from precedent.  
This part discusses Concepcion’s broad and narrow holdings, a distinc-
tion to which courts often have not been sensitive.  Part II analyzes state 
regulations on the arbitration process (whether imposed by statute or 
common law), many of which are suddenly vulnerable in light of Con-
                                                          
forcement of public laws). 
 28.  See, e.g., Robin Sidel, No Day in Court for Bank Clients, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904292504576482603037174400.html (discussing 
the debate over the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer deposit account agreements in 
the wake of Concepcion).  
 29.  See infra notes 125–282 and accompanying text (discussing various interpretations of Con-
cepcion). 
 30.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 31.  133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
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cepcion.  Open questions include whether the FAA preempts: 
 
 Rules regulating procedure 
 Rules regulating certain interlocutory appeals 
 Rules requiring a baseline entitlement to discovery 
 Rules prohibiting confidential arbitration proceedings 
 Rules regulating the division of arbitration costs 
 Rules prohibiting arbitration in far-flung jurisdictions 
 Any decision based on common law unconscionability principles 
 
We discuss the likely impact of Concepcion on these state rules, 
which are already proving to be the next battleground of FAA preemp-
tion jurisprudence.  It will be critical for courts and litigants to be aware 
of Concepcion’s dramatic effect in this area. 
Part III turns to federal regulations.  Although not technically within 
the sphere of Concepcion’s preemption holding, federal laws implicating 
arbitration also have been drawn into the firefight because they may con-
flict with the FAA’s “fundamental attributes” just as readily as state laws 
do.  The quickly evolving nature of this field is apparent.  In American 
Express, the Court considered whether the FAA—and Concepcion in 
particular—permits courts invoking the “federal substantive law of arbi-
trability”
32
 to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they 
do not permit class action arbitration of a federal law claim.
33
  Relying in 
large part on Concepcion, the Court enforced the class action waiver 
even though the cost of individual arbitration of a federal antitrust claim 
would far exceed any potential recovery.
34
  We discuss the implications 
of Concepcion and American Express on the federal common law in this 
and other contexts. 
In sum, this Article tries to make sense of the potentially boundless 
reach of Concepcion.  It is not intended to serve as a policy-based criti-
cism or a suggestion that the decision be overruled.
35
  Rather, this Article 
is intended to give courts and commentators much-needed guidance on 
the future of traditional regulations on the arbitration process.  We con-
                                                          
 32.  In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judg-
ment vacated sub nom., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010), rev’d, 133 
S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 33.  See Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 34.  See id. at 2311–12. 
 35.  For such criticisms, see supra note 27. 
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clude that state and federal public policies that attempt to curb the ex-
cesses of arbitration agreements, even those applied in the Hooters case, 
are suddenly vulnerable.  And the Court’s recent decision in American 
Express only underscores their vulnerability.  The remainder of this Arti-
cle discusses how that happened and what it means. 
II.  CONCEPCION AND ITS PREDECESSORS 
A. FAA Conflicts Before Concepcion 
The FAA has an uneasy relationship with numerous state and federal 
laws, which frequently leads to potential or actual conflicts.  It provides 
that parties may choose to arbitrate their disputes, and claims arising un-
der state and federal law generally may be resolved by arbitration.  This 
means that parties can, by contract, shape an alternative process to re-
solve disputes which is often vastly different from most court systems, 
and which exists largely outside their purview.  In many, if not most in-
stances, however, state legislatures and Congress pass laws without con-
sidering the possibility that they will be at issue in arbitration as well as 
in court.  For example, laws establishing the process for bringing certain 
claims or remedies are a particularly fertile ground for preemption is-
sues.
36
  Because there are critical distinctions for analyzing conflicts be-
tween state and federal law, as opposed to conflicts solely among federal 
statutes, this section briefly addresses the development of the Court’s 
FAA jurisprudence in both of these areas. 
By way of background, Section 2 of the FAA is comprised of two 
clauses.
37
  The first, which has been called the “command clause,” de-
clares that a contract “to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforcea-
ble” under federal law.
38
  The second is the “savings clause,” which pro-
vides a carve-out from the command clause’s general rule.  The savings 
clause says that an arbitration agreement is not “valid, irrevocable, [or] 
                                                          
 36.  See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (holding a state law purporting to vest primary 
jurisdiction over a certain type of claim in a state agency notwithstanding parties’ agreement to arbi-
trate is preempted by FAA); Mastrobuono v.  Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995) 
(rejecting the argument that arbitrators were precluded from awarding punitive damages under New 
York arbitration law, even though parties had agreed to apply New York law in a choice of law 
clause). 
 37.  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 38.  Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1090 (2011). 
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enforceable,” when “grounds [] exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract.”
39
 
Although Section 2 does not contain language expressly preempting 
state or federal law to the contrary, the Supreme Court has long held the 
provision to have preemptive effect.  Long before Concepcion, the Court 
had confronted the issue of whether the FAA trumped various applica-
tions of state or federal law.  Although the Court frequently invokes the 
FAA’s text (particularly the savings clause) in its preemption analysis, 
many believe that the Court’s precedent is not textualist, but instead pur-
posivist, in nature.
40
  Indeed, until recently, this lack of clarity in the 
Court’s analysis left many commentators and courts divided over the 
proper approach to decide whether the FAA supersedes state and federal 
rules.
41
  This part of the Article discusses that precedent—from which 
Concepcion represented a significant departure. 
1.  FAA v. State Law 
FAA preemption doctrine before Concepcion was not a model of 
clarity.  However, three general rules or standards could be gleaned from 
precedent.  First, and most obviously, the FAA preempts state law that 
prohibits arbitration outright.  Second, the FAA preempts state law that 
reflects hostility towards arbitration by singling it out for unequal treat-
ment.  Finally, and the least settled of the three, the FAA preempts state 
law that conflicts with the FAA’s purposes. 
The preemption analysis was rather clear-cut in the so-called “first 
generation” cases in which states attempted to prohibit arbitration out-
right.
42
  However, the “second generation” of arbitration regulations was 
subtler, frequently attempting to undermine arbitration through a thou-
sand cuts.  These laws restricted parties’ recourse to arbitration, imposed 
restrictions on arbitration procedure, or otherwise imposed burdens on 
                                                          
 39.  9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 40.  See, e.g., Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, supra note 27, at 1245–55. 
 41.  See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 407 
n.115 (2004). 
 42.  See id. at 393–94 (citing “‘[f]irst generation’ cases of FAA preemption involve state laws 
that invalidate parties’ agreements to arbitrate” and noting that “state legislatures have begun adopt-
ing laws that modify the parties’ arbitration agreement rather than invalidating it, regulating the arbi-
tration process rather than the parties’ obligation to arbitrate”); see also Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Op-
portunity for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1200 (2011) (employing Professor Drahozal’s 
classification for substantive laws that invalidate arbitration agreements and “result[] in the parties 
litigating, rather than arbitrating”). 
 
412 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
the arbitration process.
43
  The “second generation” arbitration regulations 
provide the most grist for the mill for lower courts dealing with FAA 
preemption. 
Regulations that expressly singled out arbitration for disfavored 
treatment could be easy to spot; however, other regulations appeared on 
their face to apply to all contracts, but in effect, imposed restrictions dis-
proportionately burdening arbitration.  Until recently, the Supreme Court 
often dodged these questions by, for example, interpreting the arbitration 
agreement so as to find state law inapplicable, thereby avoiding a con-
flict.
44
  While these cloaked preemption decisions (which we call “quasi-
preemption” cases)
45
 provide some degree of insight into FAA preemp-
tion analysis, no stable rule had emerged regarding the viability of se-
cond generation regulations.  Nor did the quasi-preemption cases portend 
the Court’s analysis in Concepcion.
46
 
a.  Prohibits Arbitration Outright 
The first case in which the Supreme Court held that the FAA 
preempted state law was Southland Corp. v. Keating.
47
  The California 
Franchise Investment Law
48
 at issue in this case invalidated any contract 
term that tried to “bind any person acquiring a franchise to waive com-
pliance with any provision of this law,”
49
 which the California Supreme 
Court interpreted as meaning that “judicial consideration of claims 
brought under that statute” was required.
50
  The California Supreme 
                                                          
 43.  Aragaki, supra note 42, at 1200–01 (noting that second generation “does not regulate the 
promise to arbitrate per se but rather only procedural matters”). 
 44.  See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
477–78 (1989).  We do not mean to suggest that state statutes attempting to keep certain classes of 
claims in court are a thing of the past.  Recently, the Supreme Court issued a terse per curiam opin-
ion, post-Concepcion, which summarily vacated and remanded a West Virginia decision that held on 
public policy and unconscionability grounds that all pre-dispute arbitration agreements with nursing 
homes for personal injury or wrongful death suits were unenforceable.  Marmet Health Care Ctr., 
Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1204 (2012). 
 45.  See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 477–78 (ordering judicial enforcement of the express 
terms of the contract and avoiding addressing the conflict between the FAA and a state law allowing 
courts to stay arbitrations); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995) 
(avoiding ruling on the conflict of law by finding that the parties did not intend for the state law to 
govern). 
 46.  See infra Part I.A.1.c. 
 47.  465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Drahozal, supra note 41, at 399.   
 48.  465 U.S. at 3–5. 
 49.  CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1970). 
 50.  Southland, 465 U.S. at 5 (emphasis added). 
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Court concluded that an arbitration agreement in a franchise contract was 
voided by the California statute, and further, that the statute was not 
preempted by the FAA.
51
 
The Supreme Court reversed the California court, holding—with 
minimal discussion—that the FAA preempted the Franchise Investment 
Law.
52
  According to the Court, in Section 2, Congress had “mandated 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.”
53
  The Court also reasoned 
that Section 2 was a declaration of a “national policy favoring arbitra-
tion,” which prohibited the states from requiring judicial resolution of 
claims when the parties agreed to arbitration.
54
  Although the Court did 
not clarify which preemption test governed under the FAA, i.e., express 
preemption, implied field preemption, etc., the Southland decision clear-




Three years later, in Perry v. Thomas, the Court considered whether 
the FAA preempted a provision in the California Labor Code permitting 
a party to bring an action in court to collect wages “without regard to the 
                                                          
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See id. at 16.  The principal issue in Southland was whether the FAA applied in state court.  
See id. at 8–9.  The majority held that by enacting the FAA, Congress created “a substantive rule 
applicable in state as well as federal courts.” Id. at 16.  This conclusion was subject to significant 
criticism by the dissent. See id. at 36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Toward 
Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1469 n.33 (1996) (“The South-
land decision is remarkable for its preemption holding that blatantly ignores legislative intent.”); 
Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 380 
(“[T]he opinion of the Court was an extraordinarily disingenuous manipulation of the history of the 
1925 Act.”).  Turning to the Franchise Investment Law, the Court stated that “Congress intended to 
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”  South-
land, 465 U.S. at 16.  With this sparse analysis, the Court concluded that the Franchise Investment 
Law, as interpreted by the California courts to require judicial consideration of claims brought under 
the statute, “directly conflicts with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy 
Clause.”  Id. at 10. 
 53.  Southland, 465 U.S. at 10. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Scholars appear to be divided over what preemption theory the Court applied in Southland.  
Compare, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-29, at 1179–80 (3d ed. 
2000) (describing Southland as an impossibility preemption case), with Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 
86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228 n.15 (2000) (“[The Supreme Court] made clear that even if one sovereign’s 
law purports to give people a right to engage in conduct that the other sovereign’s law purports to 
prohibit, the ‘physical impossibility’ test is not satisfied; a person could comply with both state and 
federal law simply by refraining from the conduct.”); see also Drahozal, supra note 41, at 407 n.115 
(“Academic commentators are divided, however, on whether FAA preemption is a form of impossi-
bility preemption or whether it is a form of obstacle preemption.”).  Forecasting Concepcion three 
decades later, the defendant in Southland argued that the FAA precludes class arbitration, an issue 
undecided by the Court.  See Southland, 465 U.S. at 17. 
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existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.”
56
  The Court in Perry 
drew from its reasoning in Southland
57
 to conclude that the California 
law, which likewise required a judicial forum to resolve wage disputes, 
was “in unmistakable conflict” with the clear federal policy underlying 
the FAA.
58
  While again, the Court did not articulate the preemption the-
ory on which it relied, the Court’s decision suggested that, at the very 
least, a state law could not nullify the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments. 
The Court in Perry refused to address whether the contract was ad-
hesive and unconscionable.
59
  However, significantly, the Court noted 
that a general contract defense, “whether of legislative or judicial origin, 
is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, 
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.”
60
  But the Court 
also explained that such a defense may not “rely on the uniqueness of an 
agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state law holding that enforcement 
would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what 
we hold today the state legislature cannot.”
61
  Therein lay the reasoning 
for an emerging second prong of the Court’s preemption analysis. 
b. Places Arbitration on Unequal Footing 
The Supreme Court also has invalidated state laws that target arbitra-
tion for unequal treatment, apparently even if they do not necessarily im-
pair parties’ ability to form a contract or inhibit the efficiency gains of 
the arbitration process.  The primary example of this analysis is found in 
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, a case addressing a Montana stat-
ute that required conspicuous notice of an arbitration provision in a con-
tract.
62
  The Montana Supreme Court concluded that the notice require-
ment did not “undermine the goals and policies of the FAA,”
63
 reasoning 
that the law did not impair the parties’ freedom to contract, and accord-
                                                          
 56.  482 U.S. 483, 484 (1987).  
 57.  470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
 58.  Perry, 482 U.S. at 491–92 (quoting Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221); see also Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. 
Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (“[W]e have held that the 
FAA pre-empts state laws which require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the con-
tracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
 59.  Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9. 
 60.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995).   
 63.  See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 685. 
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Although the Supreme Court reversed the Montana decision and in-
validated the state law, it is unclear whether the Court viewed the Mon-
tana law as interfering with the text of the FAA or with its purposes.  At 
one point, the Court stated that the Montana statute “directly conflicts” 
with the FAA because the statute applied a condition (the notice provi-
sion) to arbitration agreements that did not apply to contracts generally.
65
  
Yet the Court also stated that the “goals and policies” of the FAA and the 
Court’s precedents were “antithetical” to the Montana statute.
66
  Invok-
ing the savings clause, the Court also explained that the Montana statute 
was “inconsonant” with the FAA because it invalidated arbitration 
agreements on a ground that did not “exist at law or in equity for the rev-
ocation of any contract.”
67
 
The Doctor’s Associates preemption analysis was notable because it 
rested solely on Montana’s disparate treatment of arbitration.
68
  The 
Court did not consider whether Montana’s notice provision inhibited par-
ties’ ability to enter into arbitration agreements, nor did the Court con-
sider whether the law made arbitration slower, costlier, or less efficient.  
Indeed, the practical effect of the Montana statute was apparently irrele-
vant to the preemption analysis.  Thus, the Court appears to have struck 
down the notice provision simply because the law per se treated arbitra-
tion agreements differently than other contracts.
69
 
c. Interferes with the FAA’s Core Purpose 
The third line of cases strays farther from the FAA’s text, instead 
asking whether the state law interferes with the FAA’s goals and purpos-
es.  Cases employing this method of analysis share two interesting fea-
                                                          
 64.  See id. at 684–85 (“Section 27-5-114(4), in the Montana court’s judgment. . . did not pre-
clude arbitration agreements altogether.”). 
 65.  Id. at 687. 
 66.  Id. at 688; see also id. at 683 (concluding that the Montana statute “solely” targeted arbitra-
tion contracts). 
 67.  Id. at 688 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)). 
 68.  See, e.g., Colin P. Marks, The Irony of AT&T v. Concepcion, 87 IND. L.J. SUPP. 31, 34 
(2012) (writing that the Doctor’s Associates decision “made [it] clear” that “the FAA prevents state 
legislatures and the judiciary from creating special rules limiting the effect of, or striking down, arbi-
tration clauses with rules that are only applicable to arbitration clauses”). 
 69.  See Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 683 (“We hold that Montana’s first-page notice require-
ment, which governs not ‘any contract,’ but specifically and solely contracts ‘subject to arbitration,’ 
conflicts with the FAA and is therefore displaced by the federal measure.”). 
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tures.  First, this analysis requires a definition of the goals and purposes 
of the FAA, but the Court’s decisions have not been consistent in this re-
gard.  Second, until recently, these cases did not undertake a full preemp-
tion analysis.  Rather, the Court effectively avoided the difficult preemp-
tion questions by construing the arbitration agreements so as to avoid a 
conflict with state law.  This is why we call these “quasi-preemption” 
cases. 
The Court’s first such case was Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. 
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University.
70
  This was the 
first case in which the Court discussed FAA obstacle preemption, and it 
was the first case to address the validity of state unconscionability law as 
applied to arbitration agreements.  In Volt, the Court addressed an arbi-
tration agreement with a choice-of-law clause under which any dispute 
was governed “‘by the law of the place where the Project is located,’” 
namely, California.
71
  The Court considered whether the California Arbi-
tration Act, which allowed a court to stay arbitration pending resolution 
of related litigation, was preempted by the FAA, even though the parties 
ostensibly had chosen California law to govern.
72
 
The Court in Volt determined for the first time that potential conflicts 
between state laws and the FAA would be resolved under the obstacle 
preemption framework.  According to the Court, the “FAA contains no 
express pre-emptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent 
to occupy the entire field of arbitration.”
73
  After clarifying that express 
and field preemption theories did not apply in the FAA context,
74
 the 
Court wrote that “state law may nonetheless be pre-empted to the extent 
that it actually conflicts with [the FAA]—that is, to the extent that it 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”
75
  Thus, the FAA would displace 
the California law stay provision if it “undermine[d] the goals and poli-
                                                          
 70.  489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
 71.  Id. at 470 (citation omitted). 
 72.  Volt, 489 U.S. at 470–71; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 2013). 
 73.  Id. at 477 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956)). 
 74.  See, e.g., Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 120 n.145 (2012) (noting that “the FAA has no express 
preemptive provision” and that “state law will only be preempted by the FAA under a conflict 
preemption analysis” (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 477)); Richard C. Reuben, FAA Law, Without the Ac-
tivism: What if the Bellwether Cases Were Decided by a Truly Conservative Court?, 60 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 883, 907–08 (2012) (noting that the FAA does not address express preemption and that the 
field theory of preemption is not a compelling justification).   
 75.  Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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cies of the FAA.”
76
 
The Court then held that the FAA’s “primary purpose” was to pro-
mote the freedom of contract, because arbitration “is a matter of consent, 
not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration 
agreements as they see fit.”
77
  The Court thereby subordinated the poten-
tial efficiency gains motivating arbitration generally and the FAA specif-
ically: “While Congress was no doubt aware that the Act would encour-
age the expeditious resolution of disputes,” the Court explained, “its 
passage ‘was motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to 
enforce agreements into which parties had entered.’”
78
  Moreover, this 




Having determined that the FAA’s “primary purpose” was to honor 
the parties’ agreement, the Court essentially ended its analysis, holding 
that the FAA required judicial enforcement of the express terms of the 
contract.
80
  It was immaterial to the Court’s analysis that the contract 
would be enforced under California’s state law regime, whose stay pro-
vision might inhibit the efficient resolution of disputes.  The Court had 
deemed that its main task was to give effect to the parties’ agreement, the 
meaning of which was an issue of state law not before the Court.  Thus, 
California’s relatively inefficient system did not conflict with the FAA.
81
 
                                                          
 76.  Id. at 477–78. 
 77.  Id. at 479. 
 78.  Id. at 478 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)). 
 79.  In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Court held that the FAA “requires district courts to 
compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, 
even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in dif-
ferent forums.”  470 U.S. at 217.  In support of this proposition, the Court stated:  
We therefore are not persuaded by the argument that the conflict between two goals of 
the Arbitration Act—enforcement of private agreements and encouragement of efficient 
and speedy dispute resolution—must be resolved in favor of the latter in order to realize 
the intent of the drafters.  The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to 
enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that 
we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is “piecemeal” litigation, 
at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal statute.  By compel-
ling arbitration of state-law claims, a district court successfully protects the contractual 
rights of the parties and their rights under the Arbitration Act. 
Id. at 221 (citation omitted). 
 80.  Volt, 489 U.S. at 478 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 
403 n.12 (1967)). 
 81.  See id. at 479 (“Where, as here, the parties have agreed to abide by state rules of arbitra-
tion, enforcing those rules according to the terms of the agreement is fully consistent with the goals 
of the FAA, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the Act would otherwise permit it to 
go forward.”). 
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Although Volt represented the most definitive guidance on FAA 
preemption at the time and obstacle preemption analysis remains on firm 
footing today,
82
 the Court’s decisions soon thereafter departed from other 
aspects of Volt’s reasoning.
83
  Whereas Volt gave primacy to the plain 
language of the parties’ agreement, the Court’s later decisions employed 
other analytic presumptions, leading to results arguably inconsistent with 
the language of the contract. 
In Mastrobuono v.  Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., the Court deter-
mined that the parties did not really intend state arbitration law to gov-
ern.
84
  The contract included conflicting provisions: providing that “any 
controversy” would be governed by securities arbitration rules, but also 
that the “entire agreement” would be governed “by the laws of the State 
of New York.”
85
  The arbitrator had awarded punitive damages against a 
securities brokerage, even though New York law precluded an award of 
punitive damages.
86
  Accordingly, the brokerage firm argued that, be-
cause the parties had ostensibly chosen New York law to govern the 
terms of their dispute, the award was invalid.
87
  While one might think 
that Volt would have impelled the Court to apply the provisions of New 
York law because the parties had chosen that law to govern the terms of 
their agreement, the Court in Mastrobuono distinguished Volt and ap-
plied substantive federal law, a rare result that favored the draftee.
88
 
The Court’s key move in Mastrobuono was to elevate the “federal 
policy favoring arbitration” into a presumption well beyond what the 
Court said in Volt.
89
  Although Volt said the FAA embodied a federal 
policy favoring arbitration,
90
 that was only true if the parties had agreed 
                                                          
 82.  See, e.g., Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1241 & 
n.37 (2011) (noting that obstacle preemption is “the way in which the Court finds FAA section 2 to 
‘preempt’ state law”). 
 83.  Moreover, following Volt, the Court later invalidated a number of state laws as preempted 
by the FAA, but often did not state the theory under which they were preempted.  For example, in 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), the Court—after deciding 
the main issue, that the FAA’s scope extended to the full jurisdictional limits of the Commerce 
Clause—held that Alabama’s statute, which rendered predispute arbitration agreements unenforcea-
ble, was preempted by the FAA.  See id. at 281; see also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 
52, 58 (2003). 
 84.  514 U.S. 52, 63 (1995). 
 85.  Id. at 54–55, 58–59. 
 86.  Id. at 53. 
 87.  Id. at 54–55. 
 88.  Id. at 58. 
 89.  Id. at 62. 
 90.  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 
(1989). 
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to arbitration in the first place.
91
  Properly read, Volt gave primacy to 
contract, not arbitration.
92
  But Mastrobuono flipped the premise and the 
conclusion, reasoning that “ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration 
clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” Applying the policy of in-
terpreting ambiguities against the drafter,
93
 the Court held that the parties 
must have chosen federal law to govern.
94
  The reasoning appears circu-
lar: on one hand, the Court relied on the federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion to determine the meaning of the parties’ agreement; on the other, the 
Court strictly enforced the agreement’s meaning because the federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration required it.  The Court, notably, did not decide 
whether a state law restricting or expanding the scope of punitive dam-
ages would have been preempted under the FAA. 
The Court decided another quasi-preemption case in the context of 
class action arbitration.  In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, the 
Court again confronted the validity of state laws that banned class action 
waivers, and again did not decide whether such laws were preempt-
ed.
95
  In Bazzle, contracts between a commercial lender and its customers 
were silent as to whether class action arbitrations were permissible.
96
  
While the South Carolina Supreme Court had interpreted this silence to 
permit class actions,
97
 the Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that 
the arbitrator—not South Carolina courts—was the proper authority to 
decide whether such actions were permissible in the first instance.
98
   
What makes Bazzle notable is its dissent.  Three Justices would have 
found that the FAA preempted the South Carolina judicial rule permit-
ting class arbitration based on a different construction of the agree-
ment.
99
  In their view, the contract was not silent: because it referred to 
the consumer in the singular tense, a class action involving multiple 
                                                          
 91.  Id. at 478 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1984)). 
 92.  See id. at 476 (“There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of proce-
dural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of pri-
vate agreements to arbitrate.”). 
 93.  Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 62. 
 94.  Id. at 59–60; see also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 
88 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying federal law to a contract with a similarly ambiguous arbi-
tration clause). 
 95.  539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003). 
 96.  Id. at 450. 
 97.  Id. at 447. 
 98.  Id. at 451–54. 
 99.  Id. at 455–60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  Rehnquist’s dissent was joined by Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy and states that the “holding of the Supreme Court of South Carolina contra-
venes the terms of the contracts and is therefore pre-empted by the FAA.”  Id. at 455. 
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plaintiffs would have exceeded the contract’s plain language.
100
  Accord-
ingly, to the extent that a class action expressly conflicted with the con-
tract language, the dissent would have held that the South Carolina rule 
was preempted by the FAA.
101
  The dissent’s grounds for preemption in-
voked Volt’s reasoning about the primacy of contract enforcement.
102
  As 
it turned out, this was radically different than the justifications ultimately 
proffered by the Concepcion majority.  
Finally, in the last quasi-preemption decision before Concepcion, the 
Court in Preston v. Ferrer held that when contracting parties agree to ar-
bitrate all questions arising under a contract, the FAA preempts state 
laws that vest primary jurisdiction in another forum.
103
  The contract at 
issue in Ferrer was between a talent agent and a television star and it 
contained an arbitration provision requiring that all issues arising under 
the contract be arbitrated.
104
  California’s Talent Agency Act, however, 
vested original jurisdiction in an administrative agency.
105
 
The Court rejected the argument that state laws could require the ex-
haustion of remedies before arbitration.
106
  The Court offered several dif-
ferent reasons why the California exhaustion was inapplicable.  Preview-
ing Concepcion, the Court noted that exhaustion would frustrate the 
purposes of the FAA by “hinder[ing] speedy resolution of the controver-
sy,”
107
 but did not give the efficiency rationale a full-throated articula-
tion.  And indeed, the Court indicated elsewhere that California’s ex-
haustion requirement failed under the first two prongs of FAA 
preemption analysis because it vested “exclusive jurisdiction to decide an 
issue” in a state agency “that the parties agreed to arbitrate” (prong 1), 
and it “impose[d] prerequisites to enforcement of an arbitration agree-
ment that are not applicable to contracts generally” (prong 2).
108
 
The Court distinguished Ferrer from Volt, noting that the parties did 
not clearly choose California law since the contract also incorporated the 
rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).
109
  Because Cali-
                                                          
 100.  See id. at 458–59 (finding the terminology “you” and “your” to mean each buyer individu-
ally). 
 101.  See id. at 459.  
 102.  Id.  
 103.  552 U.S. 346, 349–50 (2008). 
 104.  Id. at 350. 
 105.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.45 et seq. (West 2003); see also Ferrer, 552 U.S. at 351. 
 106.  Ferrer, 552 U.S. at 354. 
 107.  Id. at 358. 
 108.  Id. at 347, 356. 
 109.  Id. at 361–63. 
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fornia’s exhaustion requirement could effectively foreclose arbitration by 
issue and claim preclusion, the Court concluded that the parties did not 
select California law to require initial adjudication in the administrative 
agency.
110
  The language in Ferrer thus suggests that the Court relied on 
an obstacle preemption analysis at least in part to displace the California 
law, but the Court elided the precise question as to the FAA’s purposes.   
2. FAA v. Federal Law 
There is also a body of pre-Concepcion federal common law that op-
erates as a check on the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy, known as the 
“vindication of statutory rights” principle.  As the Supreme Court noted 
years earlier, Section 2 of the FAA creates “a body of federal substantive 
law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the 
coverage of the Act.”
111
  In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., the Court held that arbitration of a federal cause of action 
was permissible only “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”
112
  Thus, if 
an arbitration clause operated “as a prospective waiver of a party’s right 
to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations,” the Court “would 




Over a decade later, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, the 
Court addressed the recurring, well-litigated, and yet unstable issue of 
cost-shifting in arbitration contracts and when an arbitration agreement 
can be invalidated on the grounds that arbitration would be prohibitively 
expensive.
114
  In Randolph, the parties agreed to arbitrate all claims un-
der their contract, including claims involving statutory rights.
115
  Howev-
er, the consumer argued that the arbitration clause was unenforceable be-
cause, by failing to mention arbitration costs and fees, it potentially 
subjected her to steep costs and thus prevented her from vindicating her 
rights under the federal Truth in Lending Act.
116
 
The Court declined to invalidate the arbitration agreement solely be-
                                                          
 110.  Id. at 362–63. 
 111.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 112.  473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). 
 113.  Id. at 637 n.19.   
 114.  531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).  
 115.  Id. at 90. 
 116.  Id. 
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cause it was silent about costs, reasoning that doing so would subvert the 
federal policy favoring arbitration.
117
  A party trying to invalidate an ar-
bitration agreement because of allegedly prohibitive arbitration costs had 
the burden of proof, the Court explained.
118
  In Randolph, the plaintiff 
did not meet that burden because she only provided speculation about her 
costs.  Accordingly, the Court punted on the question of how much evi-
dence would suffice to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the basis of 
prohibitive costs.
119
  Although the Court did not decide whether the FAA 
preempted state laws prohibiting cost shifting, many courts have adopted 
Randolph’s reasoning in their state unconscionability analysis, the impli-
cations of which we discuss below. 
B. Concepcion’s Narrow and Broad Holdings 
We now turn to Concepcion.  Properly construed, Concepcion held 
that the FAA preempts a state law rule if the rule (1) prohibits outright 
the arbitration of a particular type of claim;
120
 (2) violates the FAA’s an-
ti-discrimination principle, i.e., targets arbitration for different treatment 
than other contracts;
121
 or (3) “interferes with fundamental attributes of 
arbitration,”
122
 by undermining the procedural informality that is arbitra-
tion’s “principal advantage,”
123
 or by rendering arbitration “slower” or 
“more costly.”
124
  The first two prongs of the test were clearly settled be-
fore the decision.
125
  The third prong, however, represents Concepcion’s 
innovation: a standard only hinted at in the past, but now employed unre-
servedly despite its lack of obvious boundaries.  As we discuss below, 
Concepcion’s analysis changes slightly in the context of federal rules af-
                                                          
 117.  Id. at 91. 
 118.  Id. at 91–92. 
 119.  Id. at 92 (“How detailed the showing of prohibitive expense must be before the party seek-
ing arbitration must come forward with contrary evidence is a matter we need not discuss; for in this 
case neither during discovery nor when the case was presented on the merits was there any timely 
showing at all on the point.”). 
 120. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011) (“When state law pro-
hibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The con-
flicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”). 
 121.  Id. (“But the inquiry becomes more complex when a doctrine normally thought to be gen-
erally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here, unconscionability, is alleged to have been ap-
plied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration.”). 
 122.  Id. at 1748.   
 123.  Id. at 1751. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  See supra Part I.A.1–2.   
 
2013] CONCEPTUALIZING CONCEPCION 423 
fecting a party’s right to arbitration.
126
 
1. A Critical Examination of Concepcion’s Three-Part Test 
The facts underlying Concepcion are straightforward.
127
  Vincent and 
Liza Concepcion purchased cellular phone service from AT&T Mobility, 
LLC (AT&T).
128
  AT&T promised a free phone with the deal. The Con-
cepcions got their phones, but were charged about $30.00 in sales tax.
129
  
On this basis, the Concepcions argued that their phones were not free and 
filed a putative class action in federal district court raising false advertis-
ing and fraud claims.
130
  In response, AT&T moved to compel arbitration 
under the terms of their service contract.  The arbitration agreement con-
tained therein barred class actions;
131
 however, the contract was also 
“pro-consumer” in various respects.  For example, it guaranteed the Con-
cepcions at least $7,500 and twice their attorney’s fees if they obtained 
an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.
132
 
California’s Discover Bank rule provided that class action waivers 
rendered arbitration agreements unconscionable when (a) they were in-
cluded in a consumer contract of adhesion; (b) the disputes involved only 
small amounts of damages; and (c) the drafter’s conduct involved a 
scheme to cheat consumers.
133
  The district court denied AT&T’s motion 
to compel arbitration under Discover Bank,
134
 and the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that the FAA did not preempt the Discover Bank rule be-
cause it was simply “a refinement” of the generally applicable contract 
defense of unconscionability.
135
  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
on the issue whether Section 2 of the FAA prohibited states “from condi-
                                                          
 126.  See infra Part III. 
 127.  The relative importance of certain facts to the Court’s analysis of the case, however, is very 
much disputed in the courts and commentary alike.   
 128.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  The arbitration agreement provided for arbitration of all disputes between the parties, and 
included a class action waiver requiring that all claims be brought in the parties’ “individual capac-
it[ies], and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.”  
Id. at 1744–45. 
 132.  The agreement also provided, among other things, that in the event of arbitration, AT&T 
“must pay all costs for non-frivolous claims,” and that AT&T was prevented from seeking reim-
bursement of its attorney’s fees.  Id. at 1744. 
 133.  Id. at 1746 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)). 
 134.  Id. at 1745. 
 135.  Id. 
 
424 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
tioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availa-
bility of classwide arbitration procedures.”
136
 
The Court first considered the type of analysis that was applicable to 
determine whether the FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule.  The 
Court noted that it was not confronted with the “straightforward” analy-
sis when a state law “prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type 
of claim,” in which case the state law “is displaced by the FAA.”
137
  Ra-
ther, the Court addressed whether the FAA preempted the Discover Bank 
rule. This inquiry depended on whether “a doctrine normally thought to 
be generally applicable, such as duress or, as relevant here, unconsciona-
bility, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitra-
tion.”
138
  The Court reaffirmed the viability of generally applicable con-
tract defenses in state law, unless a court relied on the uniqueness of an 
arbitration agreement as the basis for denying enforcement of the agree-
ment.
139
  Section 2 of the FAA, the Court explained, preserves generally 
applicable contract defenses, but not state law rules that pose an obstacle 
to the objectives of the FAA.
140
 
Here, it is worth pausing to discuss a major jurisprudential departure 
in Concepcion—the Court’s pronouncement of the FAA’s objectives.  
Importantly, the Court explained that the FAA’s “overarching purpose” 
was “to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to 
their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”
141
  This state-
ment was a marked break from the past because the Court effectively 
suggested that the FAA’s ultimate goal was not only to promote the “en-
forcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms,” as the 
Court had written earlier in Volt.
142
  Concepcion is the first case in which 
the efficiency objectives of arbitration appear to trump the goal of en-
forcing agreements in the same manner as other contracts. 
But the Court went further, and made a number of assumptions about 
                                                          
 136.  Id. at 1744. 
 137.  Id. at 1747. 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id.  (noting that “a court may not ‘rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a 
basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the 
court to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot’” (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 
(1987)). 
 140.  Id. at 1748. 
 141.  Id. (emphasis added).   
 142.  Id. at 1748; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989). 
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the “fundamental attributes of arbitration.”
143
  Arbitration, the Court rea-
soned, was intended to enable parties to design their own method of dis-
pute resolution, which included establishing efficient proceedings tai-
lored to a particular type of dispute, guaranteeing that the decision maker 
is a specialist in the relevant field, and ensuring that the proceedings are 
characterized by confidentiality, informality, increased speed, and lower 
costs.
144
  Thus, efficiency, speed, lower costs, and substantive expertise 
stood alongside the freedom to contract as arbitration’s touchstones. 
There is considerable tension in the majority’s reasoning.  As the 
Court acknowledged, arbitration is fundamentally a content-neutral pro-
cedure, and the parties to an arbitration agreement could agree to what-
ever procedure suits their purposes best.  Yet, the Court also concluded 
that arbitration has the essential features of informality, speed, and cost-
efficacy.  Prodded by Justice Breyer’s dissent, the majority recognized 
that these two policies could collide if parties opted for a slow, formal, or 
expensive process, by for example agreeing to class procedures or judi-
cially-monitored discovery.
145
  However, the Court pronounced that these 
procedures would not really constitute arbitration: “[W]hat the parties in 
the aforementioned examples would have agreed to is not arbitration as 
envisioned by the FAA, lacks its benefits, and therefore may not be re-
quired by state law.”
146
  Therefore, the Court’s general notion of the 
“fundamental attributes of arbitration” was integral to the Court’s hold-
ing, and as such, state regulations of arbitration could not compel a devi-
ation from that ideal.
147
 
Interestingly, the Court’s general assumptions about arbitration ap-
pear to be suspect at best.  Arbitration is not always preferred for its 
speed, cost, and informality.
148
  And it is hardly obvious that arbitration 
is usually cheaper, quicker, or more cost-effective than litigation.  Arbi-
tration, like litigation, is not a monolith, and can vary greatly depending 
on the nature of the dispute.  Some forms of arbitration can take years or 
                                                          
 143.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 144.  Id. at 1749; see also id. at 1751 (stating that “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration 
sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration – its informality – and makes the process slower, 
more costly, and more likely to general procedural morass than final judgment”). 
 145.  See id. at 1753 (“States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even 
if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”).   
 146.  Id. at 1753. 
 147.  Id. at 1748. 
 148.  For instance, some commentators have suggested that confidentiality also ranks among the 
reasons that institutions and companies choose to resolve their disputes.  See generally Richard C. 
Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (2006). 
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even decades to reach a resolution.
149
  And although arbitration is often 
more informal than litigation, it is less predictable and the expenses of 
discovery for a large-scale arbitration are frequently comparable.
150
 
Equally suspect was the Court’s reliance on the AAA’s institutional 
rules as evidence of the “fundamental attributes of arbitration,” particu-
larly regarding the length of arbitrations.
151
  There are a number of com-
peting domestic and international institutional rules that parties may se-
lect off-the-shelf to govern a dispute.
152
  Moreover, contracting parties 
are free to craft ad hoc rules.  By relying on the AAA’s rules to the ex-
clusion of any of the other sets of institutional rules, the Court arguably 
took an unnecessarily restrictive view of the nature of arbitration. 
Moreover, the Court’s assumptions about arbitration are rooted in a 
historicist line of reasoning, one which casts aside any development in 
the meaning of arbitration in the course of the past 80 years.
153
  In other 
words, the Court looked to the drafting history of the FAA in the 1920s 
to determine what arbitration means today.  As the Court noted in Con-
cepcion: “We find it unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress meant to 
leave the disposition of these procedural requirements to an arbitrator.”
154
  
Undoubtedly, class arbitration “was not even envisioned by Congress 
                                                          
 149.  See, e.g., Charles D. Coleman, Is Mandatory Employment Arbitration Living Up to Its Ex-
pectations? A View from the Employer’s Perspective, 25 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227, 236–37 (2010) 
(noting that arbitrations involving pro se claimants are likely to result in higher costs and take longer 
while recent decisions, like Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007), and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), have afforded time and cost advantages to litigation). 
 150.  See, e.g., Lawrence W. Newman, Agreements to Arbitrate and the Predictability of Proce-
dures, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1323 (2009) (“Businesses that frequently use arbitration have been in-
creasingly critical of the fact that it has become more similar to litigation—particularly US-style 
litigation in United States courts—in large part because of increased procedural activity, including 
discovery. As arbitration becomes more formal and more complex, it becomes more expensive.”). 
 151.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (citing Brief of American Arbitration Ass’n as Amicus Cu-
riae in Support of Neither Party at 22–25, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 
662 (2010) (No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2896309, at *22–25. 
 152.  A recent study found that a sample of employment contracts that included arbitration claus-
es designating 17 different types of arbitration rules.  Erin O’Hara O’Connor et al., Customizing Em-
ployment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 163–64 (2012).  While about 70 percent of these arbi-
tration agreements specified the AAA, six different types of AAA rules were selected.  Id. at 164.  
For other types of disputes, different sets of arbitration rules and procedures may be utilized.  For 
domestic commercial disputes, parties can choose from the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the 
AAA, available at http://www.adr.org/commercial, the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and 
Procedure, available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/, or the National 
Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure, available at http://www.adrforum.com/, among others.  
 153.  See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751; see also Marks, supra note 68, at 42 (noting that the 
Court looked to the intent of the FAA’s drafters to support the proposition that that FAA only en-
courages bilateral arbitration).   
 154.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751. 
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when it passed the FAA in 1925,”
155
 which was an era in which even 
commercial arbitration was in its infancy.
156
  However, arbitration—
originally intended to be a flexible way to resolve disputes—is a rapidly 
evolving procedure, and run-of-the-mill consumer or employment arbi-
tration today bears little resemblance to the procedures that may have 
been envisioned by the FAA’s drafters (to the extent they contemplated a 
paradigmatic arbitration procedure).  Indeed, the Court recognized this 
when it agreed with the California Supreme Court that “class arbitration 
is a ‘relatively recent development.’”
157
 
After describing the objectives of arbitration, the Court held that the 
Discover Bank rule impermissibly interfered with them.
158
  The practical 
effect of the Discover Bank rule, according to the Court, was to allow 
any party to a consumer contract to demand class-wide arbitration ex 
post.
159
  Relying on its recent Stolt-Nielsen decision,
160
 the Court con-
cluded that class-wide arbitration was fundamentally different from bi-
lateral arbitration—class actions require procedural formality and a 
slower, costlier process.
161
  Accordingly, the Court in Concepcion held 
that the Discover Bank rule “stands as an obstacle” to the purposes and 




Justice Breyer, writing for the four dissenting Justices in Concep-
cion, disagreed that the Discover Bank rule posed an obstacle to the ac-
                                                          
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See Andrew P. Lamis, The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning as Reflected in the Judi-
cial Treatment of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Federal Arbitration Act, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. 
REV. 173, 195 n.77 (2003) (discussing early methods of commercial arbitration).  
 157.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (internal citation omitted). 
 158.  Id. at 1750. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686–87 & n.10 (2010) 
(holding, among other things, that an arbitrator exceeded his powers by compelling class arbitration 
when the parties had not agreed to this procedure in their arbitration agreement).  
 161.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–51 (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686). 
 162.  Id. at 1753 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  Justice Thomas provided 
the crucial fifth vote with his concurrence in Concepcion, creating a majority alongside Justice Scal-
ia’s opinion.  Justice Thomas continued to “adhere to [his] views on purposes-and-objectives pre-
emption,” meaning that he thought that form of preemption analysis was inherently flawed.  See id. 
at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Rather, in his view, § 2 of the FAA was limited elsewhere by the 
text of the FAA to account for the principle that “courts cannot refuse to enforce arbitration agree-
ments because of a state public policy against arbitration, even if the policy nominally applies to 
‘any contract.’”  Id.  However, because Justice Thomas considered that his textual reading of the 
FAA generally would reach the same conclusion as that of Justice Scalia, he “reluctantly” joined the 
Court’s opinion.  Id.  
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complishment and execution of the FAA.
163
  First, the dissent noted that 
the Discover Bank rule did not categorically void every arbitration 
agreement that included a class action waiver.
164
  Rather, in the dissent’s 
view, the Discover Bank rule only voided “some” class action waivers in 
the arbitration context as unconscionable, which therefore was just a spe-
cific application of the more general doctrine of unconscionability.
165
 
The dissent next took issue with the notion, apparently adopted by 
the majority, that the FAA’s primary objective was to ensure efficiency 
and the other procedural advantages that often may accompany arbitra-
tion.
166
  According to the dissent, the “primary” and “basic” objective of 
the FAA was to “secure the ‘enforcement’ of agreements to arbitrate,”
167
 
and to “assur[e] that courts treat arbitration agreements ‘like all other 
contracts,’” respectively.
168
  The dissent found lacking any support in the 
text of the FAA and its legislative history for the proposition that indi-
vidual—rather than class—arbitration is a “fundamental attribut[e]” of 
arbitration,
169
 or that the Discover Bank rule would serve to discourage 
the use of arbitration.
170
 
Accordingly, the dissent wrote that the relative advantages and dis-
advantages of class proceedings addressed at length by the majority were 
not implicated because the Discover Bank rule placed arbitration con-
tracts on equal footing as other contracts.
171
  Because the Discover Bank 
rule applies equally to litigation and arbitration and thus did not single 
out arbitration for disfavored treatment, the dissent wrote that it was un-
                                                          
 163.  Id. at 1756–57 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 164.  Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 165.  See id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining “[t]he Discover Bank rule does not cre-
ate a ‘blanket policy in California against class action waivers’ . . . . Instead, it represents the ‘appli-
cation of a more general [unconscionability] principle’”) (internal citation omitted)). 
 166.  Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that Congress’s primary goal with the FAA 
was actually to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements); see also id. at 1748 (majority 
opinion) (writing that “[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings”); id. at 
1749 (stating that “[t]he point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to 
allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute”); id. at 1751 (holding that 
“informality” is the “principal advantage of arbitration”). 
 167.  Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 
221 (1985)). 
 168.  Id. at 1761  (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 
U.S. 440, 447 (2006)). 
 169.  Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where does the majority get its contrary idea—that 
individual, rather than class, arbitration is a ‘fundamental attribut[e]’ of arbitration . . . . [I]t is un-
likely to be able to trace its present view to the history of the arbitration statute itself.”). 
 170.  Id. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 171.  Id. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
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precedented for the Court to strike down the California law as incon-
sistent with the FAA.
172
  Rather, the dissent stated, general contract de-
fenses such as duress and unconscionability were defenses to enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement under the FAA, and “arbitration law 
normally leaves such matters to the States.”
173
  In the absence of “mean-
ingful precedent” supporting the majority’s decision, the dissent would 
have upheld the Discover Bank rule to “honor federalist principles.”
174
 
2. American Express 
In its recent American Express decision, the Supreme Court applied 
the principles of Concepcion to compel arbitration of federal antitrust 
claims, even though the plaintiffs had alleged that a class action waiver 
and other contract terms foreclosed any meaningful ability to vindicate 
their rights in arbitration.  Below we give an overview of the American 
Express case before we turn to discuss competing perspectives of the an-
alytical rule established by Concepcion. 
At issue in American Express was a standard-form contract between 
American Express and certain merchants that accepted American Ex-
press charge cards.
175
  The contract contained a mandatory arbitration 
clause that prohibited all class action claims.
176
  The merchants filed suit 
under the Sherman Act, alleging that American Express used its market 
power to force merchants to accept payment by charge cards and to im-
pose fees that are about 30 percent higher than the fees of competing 
credit cards.
177
  The merchants presented undisputed testimony from an 
economist that “it would not be worthwhile for an individual plaintiff . . . 
to pursue individual arbitration or litigation where the out-of-pocket 
costs, just for the expert economic study and services, would be at least 
several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million.”
178
 
The Second Circuit struck down the arbitration clause because it cre-
ated a scenario where it would be “financially impossible for the plain-
tiffs to seek to vindicate their federal statutory rights” if a judicial class 
                                                          
 172.  Id. at 1758–59, 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 173.  Id. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 174.  Id. at 1762 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 175.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).  
 176.  Id. at 2308. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
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action was unavailable.
179
  In so ruling, the Second Circuit distinguished 
Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen, taking pains to emphasize that it was not 
holding “that class action waivers in arbitration agreements are per se 
unenforceable, or even that they are per se unenforceable in the context 
of antitrust actions.”
180
  Rather, the Second Circuit explained that the 




The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit by a vote of 5-3.
182
  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected the merchants’ argument 
that the arbitration agreements were unenforceable under Mitsubishi and 
Randolph, despite the merchants’ claim that they were prevented from 
effectively vindicating their rights under federal antitrust laws.  The ma-
jority characterized the “effective vindication” principle as a “judge-
made exception to the FAA” that “originated as dictum.”
183
  Rather than 
flatly rejecting this principle of federal common law, the majority held 
that the plaintiffs had not shown that the American Express arbitration 




According to the majority, the class action waiver and related con-
tract terms merely limited who could arbitrate a claim, which did not rise 
to the level of a waiver of the merchants’ right to pursue their federal 
statutory remedies.
185
  As the Court explained, “the fact that it is not 
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not con-
stitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”
186
 
The American Express majority unreservedly applied Concepcion’s 
preemption-based reasoning to facts that presented a potential conflict 
between federal antitrust law and the FAA.  The majority not only dis-
missed the notion that Concepcion was “a case involving pre-emption 
and not the effective-vindication exception,” but even went so far as to 
write that Concepcion “all but resolves this case.”
187
  Moreover, the ma-
jority explained that Concepcion had “invalidated a law” requiring class 
                                                          
 179.  Id. at 219.  
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at  2312. 
 183.  Id. at 2310. 
 184.  Id. at 2310–11. 
 185.  Id. at 2311. 
 186.  Id.  
 187.  Id. at 2312 & n.5. 
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arbitration—notably omitting the fact that it was a state law—”because 
that law ‘interfere[d] with fundamental attributes of arbitration,’” name-
ly, informality, efficiency, reduced costs, and speed.
188
 
Significantly, the American Express majority stated that the Court in 
Concepcion had “specifically rejected the argument that class arbitration 
was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the 
legal system.’”
189
  And, extrapolating from this principle, the majority 
held that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps 
any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims,” which is an 
interest “‘unrelated’ to the FAA.”
190
  The majority wrote that the effec-
tive vindication of rights analysis as employed by the Second Circuit re-
quired litigation about the merits claim-by-claim, the cost of the under-
taking, as well as the potential recovery; and the evidence was required 
to prevail on the merits.
191
  According to the majority, such a “prelimi-
nary litigating hurdle” would sacrifice the “speedy resolution that arbitra-
tion . . . was meant to secure,” as the class arbitration requirement had 
done in Concepcion, and was therefore not permitted under the FAA.
192
 
Justice Kagan wrote a vehement dissent in which Justices Ginsburg 
and Breyer joined.  In a “nutshell,” the dissent wrote, the American Ex-
press arbitration clause “imposes a variety of procedural bars that would 
make pursuit of the antitrust claim a fool’s errand,” meaning that if it 
were enforced, American Express effectively “insulated itself from anti-
trust liability.”
193
  The dissent determined that the effective vindication 
doctrine barred enforcement of an arbitration agreement when doing so 
would “confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal claims.”
194
  
The dissent stated that an arbitration agreement “may not thwart federal 
law, irrespective of exactly how it does so,” and highlighted the overrid-
ing importance of the effective vindication principle, which “reconciles 
the [FAA] with all the rest of federal law.”
 195
 
The dissent explained that there were “endless” opportunities for an 
arbitration agreement to effectively insulate a company from liability, 
                                                          
 188.  See id. at 2312 (alteration in original) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011)). 
 189.  Id. (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753). 
 190.  Id. at 2312 n.5. 
 191.  Id. at 2312. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
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besides a plainly unenforceable exculpatory provision, such as: “Mer-
chants may bring no Sherman Act claims.”
196
  According to the dissent, 
each of the following would have an “identical effect”: (1) “outlandish” 
filing fees; (2) absurd statutes of limitations, e.g., one day; (3) an agree-
ment preventing introduction of certain kinds of evidence necessary to 
prove certain claims, e.g., economic testimony for an antitrust claim; (4) 
the appointment of an obviously biased arbitrator, e.g., the American Ex-
press CEO (or his designee); or (5) limitations on the arbitrator’s authori-
ty to grant meaningful relief.
197
  That the effective vindication principle 
bars enforcement of such terms in an arbitration clause, the dissent 
wrote, was well supported by precedent.  Moreover, the dissent found 
that application of this principle furthered the FAA’s purposes (as well as 
other federal statutes) by “ensuring that arbitration remains a real, not 
faux, method of dispute resolution.”
198
 
The dissent would have judged the American Express arbitration 
agreement in view of its related contract provisions, such as the confi-
dentiality clause, the bar on joinder or consolidation of parties, and the 
prohibition on cost shifting to American Express, even if the merchants 
were ultimately successful on their claims.
199
  Because an appropriate 
expert report would indisputably cost at least several hundred thousand 
dollars, and an individual plaintiff would shoulder all such costs , the dis-
sent concluded that the American Express contract read in its entirety 
rendered arbitration “prohibitively expensive,” thus preventing effective 
vindication of the merchants’ rights.
200
 
3.  Alternative Interpretations of Concepcion 
We read Concepcion as establishing a three-prong disjunctive test: 
the FAA preempts a state law rule if that rule (1) prohibits outright the 
arbitration of a particular type of claim; (2) violates the FAA’s anti-
discrimination principle by singling arbitration for disparate treatment; or 
(3) interferes with arbitration’s fundamental attributes of efficiency, re-
duced costs, speed, and informality.
201
  Some courts and commentators 
                                                          
 196.  Id. at 2313–14. 
 197.  Id. at 2314. 
 198.  Id. at 2315. 
 199.  See id. at 2316 (stating that when the agreement was viewed as a whole, it served as a pro-
spective waiver of liability for Sherman Act claims). 
 200.  Id. at 2316–17 (citations omitted). 
 201.  See infra Part III (discussing Concepcion’s impact vis-à-vis federal rules and regulations).  
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have interpreted Concepcion differently and we believe that these inter-
pretations often fail to appreciate the full import of Concepcion.  Such 
constrained interpretations of Concepcion are even less persuasive fol-
lowing American Express.  We address these alternative interpretations, 
which are by no measure mutually exclusive or completely inconsistent 
with our reading of this landmark decision. 
a. Concepcion as Limited to Federal Courts 
One of the narrowest interpretations of Concepcion is that its reason-
ing is limited to actions brought in federal court.
202
  It is based on the fact 
that Justice Thomas’s concurrence was necessary to create a majority, 
and it relies on the position taken by Justice Thomas in Allied-Bruce 
Terminix and other cases that the FAA simply “does not apply in state 
courts.”
203
  Adherents of this argument would say that Justice Scalia or 
Justice Thomas had no occasion to mention this severe limitation on 
Concepcion because the dispute arose in federal court, and thus Justice 




The position that the FAA does not apply in state courts has never at-
tracted more than a minority of the Supreme Court.  Significantly, this 
possible interpretation is undermined because Justice Thomas concurred 
in full in Justice Scalia’s opinion, and did not indicate that he would have 
reached a different result if Concepcion arose in state court.
205
  As far as 
we are aware, no court has adopted this position.
206
  In any event, this in-
                                                          
 202.  Several commentators have speculated whether Concepcion could be so limited.  See, e.g., 
Michael A. Wolff, Is There Life After Concepcion? State Courts, State Law, and the Mandate of 
Arbitration, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1269, 1276–78 (2012) (noting the possibility that Justice Thomas’s 
fifth vote for the majority was intended to limit the majority’s holding to cases arising in federal 
court); Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Su-
preme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 489 n.148 (2011) (noting 
the importance of the fact that Concepcion originated in federal court).   
 203.  Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285–86 (1995) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); see also id. at 291 (arguing that “the FAA treats arbitration simply as one means of 
resolving disputes that lie within the jurisdiction of the federal courts”) 
 204.   See id. at 291 (“[T]he reason that § 2 does not give rise to federal-question jurisdiction is 
that it was enacted as a purely procedural provision.  For the same reason, it applies only in the fed-
eral courts.” (emphasis omitted)).  Similarly, there would have been no occasion for the Justices to 
mention this potential distinction in American Express, which also came up through the federal 
courts. 
 205.  See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753–56 (2011) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 206.  See, e.g., McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 112 So. 3d 1176, 1184–85 (Fla. 
2013) (rejecting the argument that “Concepcion does not apply to actions brought in state court” 
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terpretation fails to account for the fact that in his concurrence, Justice 
Thomas expressed the importance of “giv[ing] lower courts guidance 
from a majority of the Court,” thus implicitly endorsing the broad rea-




b. Concepcion as Hinging on the Pro-Consumer Aspects of the 
Arbitration Agreement 
Another restrictive interpretation of Concepcion limits the decision 
in large part to its facts.  Under this interpretation, the outcome was 
uniquely the product of an arbitration agreement containing so many pro-
consumer terms that the Court had characterized it as “essentially guar-
antee[ing]” consumers the ability to press meritorious claims that would 
make them whole.
208
  The penultimate paragraph of Concepcion provides 
some evidence for this interpretation: 
The dissent claims that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-
dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system.  But States 
cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desir-
able for unrelated reasons.  Moreover, the claim here was most unlikely to go 
unresolved.  As noted earlier, the arbitration agreement provides that AT & T 
will pay claimants a minimum of $7,500 and twice their attorney’s fees if they 
obtain an arbitration award greater than AT & T’s last settlement offer.  The 
District Court found this scheme sufficient to provide incentive for the individ-
ual prosecution of meritorious claims that are not immediately settled, and the 
Ninth Circuit admitted that aggrieved customers who filed claims would be 
“essentially guarantee[d]” to be made whole.  Indeed, the District Court con-
cluded that the Concepcions were better off under their arbitration agreement 
with AT & T than they would have been as participants in a class action, which 
“could take months, if not years, and which may merely yield an opportunity to 
                                                          
based on Justice Thomas’s longstanding position on the FAA, because “Concepcion does not make 
the distinction . . . nor does Justice Thomas in his concurrence”); Feeney v. Dell Inc., No. MICV 
2003-01158, 2011 WL 5127806, at *7 n.10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 2011) (rejecting argument that 
Concepcion does not apply “because this case arose in the state courts and Justice Thomas, who 
joined the Concepcion majority, votes against application of the FAA to state court proceedings”), 
rev’d on different grounds, 993 N.E.2d 329 (Mass. 2013); see also Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns 
Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561, 570 (Ky. 2012) (rejecting argument that Justice Thomas’s separate opin-
ion was not a “full concurrence”). 
 207.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).  And, in any event, Justice 
Thomas concluded that the Discover Bank rule did not operate to bar arbitration of the parties’ dis-
pute based on a “textual interpretation” of the FAA, and notably, he stated that this test “will often 
lead to the same outcome” as Justice Scalia’s obstacle preemption analysis.  Id. at 1753–54. 
 208.  Id. at 1753 (majority opinion). 
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submit a claim for recovery of a small percentage of a few dollars.”
209
 
Under this interpretation, the Court found that the generally “pro-
consumer” nature of the Concepcion arbitration agreement was material 
to its resolution of the case.  The Court rejected the proposition that class 
proceedings were necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims, and argua-
bly did so because the “scheme [was] sufficient to provide incentive for 
the individual prosecution of meritorious claims that were not immedi-
ately settled,” and because aggrieved customers were “essentially guar-
antee[d]” to be made whole.
210
 Therefore, by limiting the holding to the 
narrow, fact-bound interpretation of Concepcion, if the arbitration 
agreement’s terms were less consumer-friendly, Concepcion would not 
require arbitration when an otherwise-applicable, facially neutral state 
law would have foreclosed arbitration. 
Some commentators have noted the possibility that “[c]ourts could 
limit Concepcion to its unusual facts – emphasizing that the arbitration 
clause used by [AT&T] was extremely pro-consumer,”
211
 and indeed, a 
few courts have attempted to limit Concepcion in this manner.
212
  In 
Feeney v. Dell, Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts of-
fered perhaps the most vigorous articulation of this position.
213
  There, 
the court concluded that Concepcion does not indorse the enforcement of 
an arbitration clause that includes a class action waiver when “a plaintiff 
can demonstrate that he or she effectively cannot pursue a claim against 
                                                          
 209.  Id. at 1753 (quoting Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 856 n.9 (9th Cir. 
2009); Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *12 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008)).   
 210.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 211.  See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 27, at 708 (noting the argument, but finding that most 
courts have not so limited their reading of Concepcion and instead are broadly applying the decision 
“as a ‘get out of class actions free’ card”). 
 212.  See, e.g., Feeney v. Dell Inc., 989 N.E.2d 439, 461 (Mass. 2013) (separating the Concep-
cion fact scenario from other arbitration agreements by noting that where an “arbitration agreement 
does not feature the safeguards found in the Concepcion agreement, a court may still invalidate a 
class waiver”); Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 493–94 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (distin-
guishing Brewer from Concepcion on the basis that expert testimony in Brewer supported a finding 
that there was “no practical, viable means of individualized dispute resolution”). 
 213.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s decision in Feeney was issued eight days 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in American Express was released.  The Massachusetts court 
subsequently reversed course on reconsideration, writing, among other things, that the Supreme 
Court in American Express “made clear that its discussion in Concepcion of the likelihood that those 
plaintiffs’ claims could be resolved in individual arbitration did not contribute to its holding in that 
case and, in doing so, thwarted our reliance . . . on that discussion.”  Feeney v. Dell Inc., 993 N.E.2d 
329, 331 (Mass. 2013).  
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the defendant in individual arbitration.”
214
  The Massachusetts court sup-
ported this position, writing that “Concepcion goes to great length to 
demonstrate the overall fairness of that agreement and the Court’s belief 
that a consumer could successfully pursue a remedy under the regime it 
established.”
215
  Likewise, the Supreme Court of Missouri in Brewer v. 
Missouri Title Loans distinguished the arbitration agreement at issue 
from the agreement in Concepcion.
216
  In that case,  the court character-
ized the agreement at issue as “extremely one-sided” and a “substantial 
obstacle . . . to the resolution of any consumer disputes against the title 
company,” as contrasted with the arbitration agreement in Concepcion, 
about which the Missouri court approvingly noted that “AT&T shoul-
dered the costs of arbitration.”
217
 
A fact-bound interpretation of Concepcion emphasizing the pro-
consumer nature of the dispute resolution process is not persuasive.  The 
Court’s language in Concepcion about the pro-consumer nature of the 
arbitration agreement admittedly appears to have been included in re-
sponse to the dissent’s suggestion that “class proceedings are necessary 
to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the le-
gal system.”
218
  However, in the very next sentence, the Court deemed 
these concerns legally irrelevant, stating that the FAA preempted con-
flicting state laws, and that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is 
inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated rea-
sons.”
219
  Considering the context and structure of the opinion, this lan-
guage merely suggests that the Court believed the dissent’s concerns that 
consumers would not have a remedy against AT&T were not factually 
supported in this case, but, in any event, legally irrelevant.  Moreover, it 
is difficult to tell how the Court’s preemption analysis would have fared 
better under a more one-sided contract.  Therefore, even before American 
Express, most courts disagreed with a fact-based interpretation of Con-
cepcion resting on the pro-consumer elements of the arbitration agree-




                                                          
 214.  Feeney, 989 N.E.2d at 441. 
 215.  Id. at 456. 
 216.  Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 493. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  See, e.g., Hodsdon v. DIRECTV, LLC, No. C 12-02827 JSW, 2012 WL 5464615, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2012) (noting that the “[p]laintiffs’ argument [was] based on a . . . faulty premise: 
 
 
2013] CONCEPTUALIZING CONCEPCION 437 
If the pro-consumer aspects of the arbitration agreement or the fact 
that the aggrieved customers were “essentially guaranteed to be made 
whole”
221
 in bilateral arbitration were material to the Court’s analysis in 
Concepcion, one likely would have expected a different result in Ameri-
can Express.  By contrast, in American Express, even though the cost of 
individual arbitration exceeded any potential recovery, the majority re-
jected the merchants’ effective vindication argument largely on the basis 
that Concepcion “established . . . that the FAA’s command to enforce ar-
bitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of 
low-value claims.”
222
  In other words, in American Express, a merchant 
bringing a federal antitrust claim was essentially guaranteed not to be 
made whole because the costs of bilateral arbitration exceeded the poten-
tial recovery.  Thus, Concepcion cannot be understood to hinge on the 
pro-consumer aspects of the arbitration agreement in that case, either 
based solely on a reading of Concepcion or interpreted in light of Ameri-
can Express. 
c. Concepcion as Hinging on the Discriminatory Nature or Application 
of the Discover Bank Rule 
Another restrictive reading of Concepcion emphasizes that the deci-
sion was merely an extension of the anti-discrimination principle, i.e., 
that arbitration agreements may not be singled out for disfavored treat-
ment.  Under this view, there are several reasons why the Discover Bank 
rule might have been discriminatory. 
First, the Discover Bank rule was arguably discriminatory in its judi-
cial application.  One might try to characterize the rule as one that almost 
                                                          
that the Concepcion ruling was dependent on the consumer-friendly aspects of the provision at issue 
in that case” and that “courts have generally rejected [that] very claim”); McKenzie Check Advance 
of Fla., LLC, 112 So.3d 1176, 1187–88 (Fla. 2013) (stating that Concepcion precludes class action 
waivers from being invalidated simply because small-value claims would prevent consumers from 
obtaining counsel); Schnuerle v. Insight Commc’ns Co., L.P., 376 S.W.3d 561, 572–73 (Ky. 2012) 
(stating that “[a] careful reading of Concepcion discloses that the unusually consumer-friendly terms 
of the AT & T agreement were not particularly relevant to the Supreme Court’s holding,” and that 
“[t]hat factor simply was not central to the Supreme Court’s holding”); NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. 
v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777, 799 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (finding that the attempts 
to distinguish Concepcion, including the argument that Concepcion’s arbitration provisions in dis-
pute were less consumer-friendly, unpersuasive).  
 221.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (internal grammatical marks omitted). 
 222.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 n.5 (2013).  By contrast, 
the dissent argued that the effective-vindication rule was not at issue in—and thus not implicated 
by—Concepcion, given the fact that the arbitration agreement in that case had a “host of features 
ensuring that ‘aggrieved customers who filed claims would be essentially guaranteed to be made 
whole.’”  Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753).  
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categorically invalidated certain arbitration agreements.  According to 
this interpretation, the Court in Concepcion would have reached a differ-
ent conclusion if the challenged state law had less of a disparate impact 
on the enforcement of arbitration agreements.  In other words, so long as 
state law restrictions on arbitration determine the enforceability of the 
agreement based on the specific facts of the case, those restrictions can 
be distinguished from Concepcion. 
This interpretation arguably follows from the Supreme Court’s de-
scription of the Discover Bank rule as one that “condition[ed] the en-
forceability of certain arbitration agreements on the availability of class-
wide arbitration procedures.”
223
  Moreover, the Court stated that the rule 
“classif[ies] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable.”
224
  And, significantly, the Court found noteworthy, alt-
hough “not definitive,” certain statistical evidence that “California’s 
courts have been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconsciona-
ble than other contracts.”
225
 
After Concepcion, there is some support for the proposition that the 
nearly categorical application of the Discover Bank rule was a material 
consideration in the Court’s analysis.
226
  A few courts have seized on the 
Court’s description of Discover Bank to argue that the FAA did not 
preempt other challenged state laws that do not categorically discrimi-
nate against arbitration, but rather examined the specific facts underlying 
any given dispute. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri in Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 
for example, emphasized that the “practical effect” of the Discover Bank 
rule had been to “create[] an essentially categorical requirement of class 
arbitration.”
227
  Thus, the court determined, the Discover Bank rule ren-
dered class arbitration waivers unconscionable “even if traditional factors 
of unconscionability are absent,”
228
 and even where, as in Concepcion, 
bilateral arbitration could be more advantageous to consumers than pro-
                                                          
 223.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744 (emphasis added). 
 224.  Id. at 1746 (emphasis added). 
 225.  Id. at 1747. 
 226.  See, e.g., Marks, supra note 68, at, 43–44 (stating that if Concepcion was merely an ex-
tension of the well-settled principle that state laws “may not single out arbitration provisions for dif-
ferent treatment,” “an unconscionability ruling forbidding class-action waivers on an ad hoc basis 
could survive Concepcion”); Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action 
Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 439 (2012) (stating that some low-
er courts have “read[] Concepcion [sic] narrowly to preclude only categorical rules that ban class 
action waivers”).   
 227.  Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 489 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 228.  Id.  
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ceeding as part of a class.
229
  The logic underlying this narrow interpreta-
tion of Concepcion is in its most basic form the following: while Con-
cepcion held that a rule that categorically invalidates arbitration clauses 
is preempted by the FAA, our analysis is appropriately grounded on the 
facts of the case.  There is no mystery to the appeal of this narrow inter-
pretation.  Some courts are reluctant to find that all restrictions on class 




Conversely, most courts have taken the opposite approach and held 
that Concepcion categorically strikes down all state law restrictions on 
class arbitration waivers as preempted by the FAA.  As one leading 
commentator on the FAA put it, “[a]s interpreted by most courts, [Con-
cepcion] is destroying virtually all possible attacks on arbitral class ac-
tion waivers.”
231
  Therefore, while plaintiffs repeatedly have argued after 
Concepcion that class action waivers can be determined to be uncon-




The majority of courts have the better argument.  As noted above, 
the Court’s reasoning was not grounded in an anti-discrimination princi-
ple, but rather in a conflict between the purposes of the FAA and the ef-
fects of the Discover Bank rule.  If that rule was invalid merely because 
it was applied in a discriminatory manner, the Court might have said so 
and left the opinion at that.  But the Court made that point
233
 and went 
much further.
234
  And any interpretation of Concepcion that renders most 
of the opinion superfluous dicta—i.e., the Discover Bank rule conflicts 
with the fundamental attributes of arbitration and purposes of the FAA—
cannot be correct. 
                                                          
 229.  See id. at 494 (“Instead, the critical flaw leading to the preemption of the Discover Bank 
rule was that it required class arbitration even if class arbitration disadvantaged consumers and was 
unnecessary for the consumer to obtain a remedy.”).   
 230.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Maronda Homes, Inc. of Fla., 98 So.3d 127, 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2012) (LaRose, J., specially concurring) (opining that “it is not entirely clear” whether Concepcion 
“establishes a categorical rule against class arbitration”).   
 231.  Sternlight, supra note 27, at 709. 
 232.  See, e.g., Clemins v. GE Money Bank, No. 11-CV-00210, 2012 WL 5868659, at *5 (E.D. 
Wis. Nov. 20, 2012) (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument “that Concepcion only prohibits states from mak-
ing class-action waivers invalid per se and that a court can still find a class action waiver to be un-
conscionable on a case-by-case basis”).   
 233.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011) (stating that a gen-
erally applicable contract defense cannot ‘“rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a 
basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable’” (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 
482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987))). 
 234.  See id. at 1748–53 (discussing the Discover Bank rule’s interference with the “fundamen-
tal attributes of arbitration,” thereby “creat[ing] a scheme inconsistent with the FAA”). 
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Moreover, American Express does not support the argument that 
Concepcion’s reasoning was based on the fact that the California law had 
been applied by the courts in a manner that discriminated against arbitra-
tion.  The Second Circuit’s analysis in that case indisputably was 
grounded in the facts of the parties before the court: it was undisputed 
that the plaintiff’s cost of individual arbitration would exceed any poten-
tial recovery.
235
  Moreover, nowhere in the American Express majority’s 
analysis did the Court suggest that the federal courts had been applying 
the “effective vindication” principle in Mitsubishi and Randolph in a 
manner that discriminated against arbitration agreements.  Indeed, in her 
dissent, Justice Kagan plainly stated that the opposite was true: “[F]or 
almost three decades, courts have followed our edict that arbitration 




The second variation of the anti-discrimination theory characterizes 
the Discover Bank rule as discriminatory by its very nature, irrespective 
whether the rule had any practical effect on the arbitration process.  Un-
der this view, the Discover Bank rule was discriminatory because it as-
sumed arbitration would be an inadequate substitute to litigation without 
a class action mechanism.
237
  This interpretation derives support from the 
Court’s dicta about the impropriety of imposing judicial procedure, such 
as the Federal Rules of Evidence, in the arbitration process.
238
  Of course 
this dicta is open to multiple interpretations, as “Justice Scalia does not 
elaborate on why the ‘horribles’ . . . would be preempted.”
239
 
Properly read, Concepcion is not grounded in this variation of the an-
ti-discrimination principle.  First, the Court in Concepcion plainly men-
tioned judicially monitored discovery and strict evidentiary standards in 
the same breath during its discussion that the FAA was intended to pro-
vide parties the opportunity to design “streamlined proceedings.”
240
  And 
                                                          
 235.   See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013) (stating that 
arbitration costs could total more than a million dollars while the maximum recovery a plaintiff 
could hope to receive was $12,850).   
 236.  Id. at 2315–16 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, 
at 26–27). 
 237.  See Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption,  supra note 27 at 1237–38 (noting that 
plaintiffs would lack incentive to bring claims with small damages if there was no class action op-
tion). 
 238.  See id. at 1272 (stating that “[a]fter all, state rules that mandate ‘judicially monitored dis-
covery,’ [and] ‘the Federal Rules of Evidence,’ . . . are frontal assaults on arbitration” (quoting 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011))). 
 239.   Id. 
 240.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 
2013] CONCEPTUALIZING CONCEPCION 441 
second, the Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen undermines this discrimina-
tion theory.  In that case, the Court held that an arbitrator manifestly dis-
regarded his authority under the FAA by imposing class arbitration 
where the parties were silent on the issue.
241
  Thus, imposing class arbi-
tration was held to be improper for reasons that had nothing to do with 
concerns about a state (or the courts) discriminating against arbitration.  
Rather, the Court concluded, “class action arbitration changes the nature 
of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties con-
sented to it”
242
 because it eviscerates the benefits of arbitration, which 
include “forgo[ing] the procedural rigor and appellate review of the 
courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower 
costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adju-
dicators to resolve specialized disputes.”
243
  Thus, these principles in 
Stolt-Nielsen, which were cited in Concepcion,
244
 clarify the Court’s rea-
soning: class arbitration interferes with the fundamental attributes of ar-
bitration, irrespective of the FAA’s purposes of preventing discrimina-
tion against arbitration, and neither the arbitrator nor state law may 
require class-wide procedures unless the parties authorize them.
245
 
d. Concepcion as Limited to Class-Waivers 
Another potential interpretation of Concepcion would limit its 
preemptive effects to state law rules regulating class action or class arbi-
tration waivers.
246
  Such a narrow interpretation could arguably be based 
on the fact that the Court explicitly framed the issue in the case as 
                                                          
 241.   Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2010) (explaining 
that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a 
contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so,” and holding that the arbitrators’ con-
trary conclusion was “fundamentally at war with the foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a 
matter of consent”). 
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id.   
 244.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. 662at 685). 
 245.  Finally, another argument has been advanced that the Discover Bank rule might be said to 
have discriminated against arbitration by treating different institutions (arbitration and litigation) as 
if they were the same.  See Hiro Aragaki, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Antidiscrimination 
Theory of FAA Preemption, 4 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 39, 67 (2013) (explaining that Concepcion 
“helps establish that arbitration and litigation are differently situated, such that treating them exactly 
the same (as Discover Bank does) amounts to a type of discrimination”).  This idea draws on prece-
dent from the gender discrimination context, under which disparate treatment occurs by ignoring 
relevant biological differences between men and women.  While there is much to say about this nov-
el reading, Concepcion itself says very little to support it.  
 246.  Jonathon L. Serafini, Note, The Deception of Concepcion: Saving Unconscionability After 
AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 212 (2012) (stating that “[t]he narrow-
est interpretation of Concepcion is that it only applies to cases that involve class action waivers”). 
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whether a state law rule classifying most class arbitration waivers as un-
conscionable was preempted by the FAA.
247
  Several courts like the Su-
preme Court of Washington have recently opined that “[w]hether Con-




Arguments for limiting Concepcion’s reasoning to the class arbitra-
tion context are unpersuasive.  Most significantly, nothing in the reason-
ing underlying the Court’s decision lends itself to the interpretation that 
only class arbitration waivers would be affected.  Rather, it appears that 
the Discover Bank rule was but one example of a contract defense 
thought to be generally applicable, but which disproportionately applied 
to invalidate arbitration agreements by imposing a requirement incom-
patible with the FAA’s purposes.  The Court addressed numerous similar 
circumstances, albeit in hypotheticals, in which “a doctrine normally 
thought to be generally applicable, such as duress or . . . unconscionabil-
ity, is alleged to have been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitra-
tion,” which could not “sensibly be reconciled” with Section 2 of the 
FAA.
249
  For example, the Court held that a state law rule invalidating 
arbitration agreements that do not “provide for judicially monitored dis-
covery,” would be a rule that is theoretically applicable to “‘any’ contract 
and thus preserved by § 2 of the FAA,” but “[i]n practice, of course, the 
rule would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements.”
250
 
Notably, the majority in American Express did not characterize Con-
cepcion as tethered to class action waivers, writing simply that Concep-
cion “established” that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration 
agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value 
claims,” which is an interest “‘unrelated’ to the FAA.”
251
  And even more 
broadly, the majority rejected the lower court’s application of the effec-
tive vindication principle because it introduced a “preliminary litigating 
hurdle [that] would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolu-
tion” of arbitration.
252
  The Court’s admonition against imposing a “judi-
cially created superstructure” that requires assessment of preliminary 
questions about the merits of claims, evidence required to show such 
claims, and costs and likely recovery of pursuing such claims in arbitra-
                                                          
 247.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744, 1746. 
  248. See, e.g., Saleemi v. Doctor’s Assocs, Inc., 292 P.3d 108, 113 (Wash. 2013) (en 
banc). 
  249. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48. 
 250.  Id. at 1747. 
 251.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 n.5 (2013). 
 252.  Id. at 2312. 
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tion, has implications far beyond the class arbitration context.
253
 
The dissent also recognized that one could not sensibly limit Con-
cepcion to class action waivers.  Justice Kagan, in her dissent in Ameri-
can Express, provided one of the most eloquent rebuttals to those who 
would limit Concepcion’s preemptive effect to the class action waiver 
context.  It could be said that Concepcion and American Express “estab-
lish what in some quarters is known as a principle,” and “[t]hat principle, 
by its nature, operates in diverse circumstances—not just the ones that 
happened to come before the Court.”
254
  In other words, other state and 
federal restrictions on arbitration can and do “interfere[] with fundamen-
tal attributes of arbitration,” i.e., informality, efficiency, reduced costs, 




e. Concepcion as Limited to Rules Undermining Consent as the Basis 
for Arbitration 
Similarly, courts could limit Concepcion’s preemptive sweep to rules 
that implicate the principles of contractual freedom that underlie arbitra-
tion.  Arbitration derives its legitimacy from the parties’ consent, and the 
FAA’s primary purpose, at least according to Volt, is to effectuate the 
parties’ agreement.
256
  Thus, it might be argued, class arbitration under-
mines the purposes of the FAA by binding absentees, which are not par-
ties to the specific agreement to arbitrate.  The Court in Stolt-Nielsen 
briefly mentioned this point,
257
 which recently was pressed more force-
fully in Justice Alito’s concurrence in Oxford Health v. Sutter.
258
 
In Oxford Health, a unanimous Court held that an arbitrator did not 
manifestly disregard the parties’ agreement by imposing class-wide arbi-
tration because the parties had agreed to let the arbitrator decide the is-
sue.
259
  In their concurring opinion in Oxford Health, Justices Alito and 
                                                          
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 255.  Id. at 2312. 
 256.  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989). 
 257.  Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010) (noting that an 
“arbitrator’s award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single arbitration agreement, but 
adjudicates the rights of absent parties as well”).   
 258.  Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071–72 (2013) (Alito, J., concur-
ring). 
 259.  Id. at 2067 (noting that “[b]ecause the parties ‘bargained for the arbitrator’s construction 
of their agreement,’ an arbitral decision ‘even arguably construing or applying the contract’ must 
stand” (quoting Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (1960))). The 
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Thomas appeared to view class arbitration as fundamentally incompati-
ble with principles of consent.
260
  In their view, when an arbitrator de-
cides that an agreement requires class-wide procedures, that determina-
tion cannot bind absentee parties that have not opted in, and therefore 
have not submitted to the arbitrator’s authority.
261
  Moreover, “[c]lass ar-
bitrations that are vulnerable to collateral attack allow absent class mem-
bers to unfairly claim the ‘benefit from a favorable judgment without 
subjecting themselves to the binding effect of an unfavorable one.’”
262
  
Because these issues are so fundamental to arbitration, the concurrence 
suggested, the arbitrator might be ill-suited to decide the issue where the 
parties do not require it.
263
 
Thus, Discover Bank rule arguably conflicted with the FAA’s pur-
poses by mandating class arbitration, which undermined arbitration’s ba-
sis in the consent of the parties.  However, we are aware of no court lim-
iting Concepcion in this manner; and indeed, Concepcion never fully 
articulated the concurrence’s concerns in Oxford Health.  To be sure, the 
Court mentioned the problems posed by absentee class members.  But 
the tenor of that reference was that absentees were considered problemat-
ic because additional procedural formality is required to ensure their 
rights are adequately protected.
264
  Moreover, the Oxford Health concur-
rence, which does not even mention Concepcion, cannot explain the 
Court’s dicta about the impropriety of judicial procedures applied to arbi-
tration.
265
  Simply put, even though there is overlap in Concepcion’s 
analysis and the concerns about consent articulated by the concurrence in 
                                                          
Court in Oxford Health narrowly distinguished Stolt-Nielsen on the basis of this single fact: whether 
the parties consented to submit this issue of contract interpretation to the arbitrator.  Id. at 2070. 
 260.  See id. at 2071 (Alito, J., concurring) (observing that “absent members of the plaintiff 
class never conceded that the contract authorizes the arbitrator to decide whether to conduct class 
arbitration” and that the arbitrator improperly inferred that the absent parties had implicitly agreed to 
arbitration). 
 261.  See id. (“[A]n arbitrator’s erroneous interpretation of contracts that do not authorize class 
arbitration cannot bind someone who has not authorized the arbitrator to make that determination.”). 
 262.  Id. at 2072 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 546–47 (1974)).  
 263.  See id. (“In the absence of concessions [that an arbitrator should determine whether a con-
tract approved class arbitration], this possibility should give courts pause before concluding that the 
availability of class arbitration is a question the arbitrator should decide.”). 
 264.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (discussing proce-
dural concerns presented by class arbitration and noting that absent class members must be adequate-
ly represented and given notice and an option to opt out of the class before they can be bound by a 
class action judgment). 
265.  See, e.g., id. at 1747 (explaining that a rule refusing to enforce arbitration agreements that 
failed to permit judicially-monitored discovery “would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration 
agreements” and thus would be preempted, even though the rule “would presumably apply to con-
tracts purporting to restrict discovery in litigation as well”). 
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Oxford Health, there is no reason to believe that Concepcion rests on 
principles of freedom of contract or party consent. 
f.  Concepcion as Limited to Unconscionability Rules 
Section 2 of the FAA states that arbitration agreements may be held 
unenforceable “‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract,’”
266
 which has been defined by the Supreme 
Court to include “‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, 
duress, or unconscionability.’”
267
  But, despite this precedent that was not 
explicitly overruled in Concepcion, there is now a lively debate whether 
the seeds of unconscionability’s demise as a defense to arbitration are 
buried within Concepcion’s reasoning. 
There are ready arguments why unconscionability has survived, at 
least in some form, as a defense to the enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement.  Significantly in Concepcion, Justice Scalia’s plurality, Jus-
tice Thomas’s concurrence, and Justice Breyer’s dissent, all state that the 
unconscionability defense is a basis for non-enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement.
268
  Additionally, in a terse per curiam decision issued af-
ter Concepcion, the Supreme Court summarily reversed a West Virginia 
decision on the ground that the state court “‘prohibits outright the arbitra-
tion of a particular type of claim.’”
269
  However, the Court permitted the 
West Virginia court to consider on remand whether, absent the state’s 
general public policy against pre-dispute arbitration agreements for 
claims of personal injury or wrongful death against nursing homes, the 
arbitration clauses at issue were “unenforceable under state common law 
principles that are not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the 
FAA.”
270
  The other basis for the state court’s conclusion was uncon-
                                                          
 266.  Id. at 1746 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).   
 267.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).   
 268.  Id. (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (stating that § 2 of the FAA “permits agreements to arbi-
trate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or uncon-
scionability’”); id. at 1755 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that “every specific contract defense that 
the Court has acknowledged is applicable under § 2 relates to contract formation,” including “uncon-
scionability”); id. at 1756–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the Discover Bank rule “represents 
the ‘application of a more general [unconscionability] principle,’” which is a ground that ‘“exist[s] at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract’” (quoting Gentry v. Super. Ct., 165 P.3d 556, 564 
(Cal. 2007); 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006))). 
 269.  Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (quoting Con-
cepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011)). 
 270.  Id. at 1204. 
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scionability.
271
  Finally, some lower federal courts, like the Ninth Circuit, 
have concluded that “Concepcion did not overthrow the common law 
contract defense of unconscionability . . . [r]ather, the [U.S. Supreme] 
Court reaffirmed [it] . . . so long as those doctrines are ‘not applied in a 
fashion that disfavors arbitration.’”
272
  Several other federal courts of ap-
peals appear to also be in accord.
273
 
However, commentators have cautioned that a broad interpretation of 
Concepcion may actually “eliminate[] unconscionability as a defense for 
arbitration agreements completely,”
274
 or that the decision “cast[s] doubt 
on the continued application of [FAA] section 2 contract law defenses, 
specifically unconscionability.”
275
  And, at least one court appears to 
have held that public policy and unconscionability are no longer grounds 
upon which a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement, while 
“[o]ther contract principles under state law, such as those governing the 
formation and interpretation of an agreement, may still pertain.”
276
 
An argument that Concepcion threatens to undermine unconsciona-
bility as a state law defense to arbitration would likely draw on the 
Court’s statement that while generally applicable contract defenses are 
preserved in Section 2 of the FAA, “nothing in it suggests an intent to 
preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
of the FAA’s objectives.”
277
  Those objectives were broadly defined in 
Concepcion, which accordingly would result in the preemption of state 
law unconscionability rules, like the Discover Bank rule, that had the ef-
fect of requiring a process that was less efficient, or more formal, than 
                                                          
 271.  See Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 230 (W. Va. 2012)  (remanding 
to the trial court for fact-finding under West Virginia’s general unconscionability doctrine). 
 272.  Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 963 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Concepcion, 
131 S. Ct. at 1747). 
 273.  See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 685 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(concluding that “South Carolina’s unconscionability doctrine does not ‘interfere[] with fundamental 
attributes of arbitration’ as identified by the Supreme Court, and is among the ‘generally applicable 
contract defenses’ that apply to arbitration agreements under the savings clause of 9 U.S.C. § 2” (in-
ternal citation omitted) (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746–48)); see also Litman v. Cellco 
P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 230–32 (3d Cir. 2011) (including unconscionability as a “generally applicable 
contract defense” post-Concepcion, but holding that New Jersey law that waivers of class arbitration 
are unconscionable is inconsistent with the FAA and therefore pre-empted).  
 274.  Serafini, supra note 246, at 215. 
 275.  Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 767, 786 (2012); see also Stephen E. Friedman, A Pro-Congress Approach to Arbitration and 
Unconscionability, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 53, 53–54 (2011) (“While Concepcion sanctions 
the continued theoretical applicability of unconscionability to arbitration provisions, it leaves very 
little room for the actual application of the doctrine.”). 
 276.  NAACP of Camden Cnty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777, 791–92 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2012).  
 277.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).  
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the Court’s general notion of arbitration.
278
  At a high level of abstrac-
tion, unconscionability rules level the playing field between disputing 
parties of unequal bargaining power.  Thus, there is good reason to be-
lieve that, at least as those rules relate to arbitration, they will tend to re-
sult in more process, not less.  The flipside of that coin is that uncon-
scionability rules tend to sacrifice efficiency and thus fall afoul of 
Concepcion’s logic. 
In conjunction with Concepcion, the Court’s decision in American 
Express casts a long shadow over the doctrine of unconscionability as a 
defense to arbitration agreements.
279
  Undeniably, the Court took a very 
narrow view of the federal “effective vindication” of rights principle, 
asking only whether a contested term of arbitration operated to waive, or 
eliminate, a party’s “right to pursue statutory remedies.”
280
  So, while a 
contract could not directly prevent a party from bringing a federal cause 
of action, the take-away from American Express is that the terms of the 
arbitration agreement could ensure that the costs of proving the claim 
would exceed any remedy.
281
 
States define unconscionability in many ways.  All require substan-
tive unconscionability, which looks into the fairness of the terms of the 
contract.
282
  In a typical formulation, a contract term is held to be sub-
stantively unconscionable if it is “so one-sided that it shocks the con-
science,”
283
 or if it would be “grossly unreasonable” to enforce terms that 
are “unreasonably favorable to the other party.”
284
  The American Ex-
press majority, however, rebuked the Second Circuit for employing an 
analysis (the federal effective-vindication analysis) before enforcing the 
arbitration agreement, which required a claim-by-claim, theory-by-theory 
                                                          
 278.  See id. at 1751 (noting that the FAA avoids “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration[, 
which] sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process 
slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”). 
 279.  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct., 2304, 2312 (2013). 
 280.  Id. at 2310–11. 
 281.  See id. at 2311 (“[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory 
remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”).  The Court in Amer-
ican Express interprets the term “waiver” literally, so as to mean that a party may not attempt to in-
sert into an arbitration agreement a provision “forbidding the assertion of certain [federal] statutory 
rights.”  Id. at 2310. 
 282.  State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes of W. Va. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909, 921 (W. Va. 
2011).  By contrast, procedural unconscionability refers to the unfairness in the bargaining process 
leading to the formation of the contract, as by for example, limitations on a party’s ability to under-
stand contract terms, or a company’s providing contract terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  See id. 
at 920. 
 283.  Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 282 P.3d 1217, 1233 
(Cal. 2012). 
 284.  King v. Fox, 851 N.E.2d 1184, 1191 (N.Y. 2006). 
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review of plaintiff’s claims, the evidence necessary to prove such claims, 
and the costs and likely recompense if the plaintiff was ultimately suc-
cessful.
285
  State law unconscionability analysis of an arbitration agree-
ment similarly weighs the fairness to the plaintiff for each of the myriad 
of aspects of the dispute resolution process in which the plaintiff has 
agreed to participate, all in advance of the plaintiff’s participation in that 
process.
286
  Like the effective vindication of rights analysis, as employed 
by the Second Circuit, state law unconscionability could be considered a 
“preliminary litigation hurdle” or a “judicially created superstructure” 
that would “destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in 
general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure.”
287
 
At the very least then, state unconscionability law is suspect to the 
extent it relies on effective vindication principles.  While it appears that 
Concepcion and American Express will cause courts to look at uncon-
scionability challenges with a more skeptical eye, one must take the 
Court at face value that the general defense survives.  Thus, if state un-
conscionability decisions are to survive a challenge of FAA preemption, 
there must be facts showing unfairness above and beyond what has been 
required under the effective vindication test.  How egregious such facts 
must be remains an open question. 
4.  Concepcion Unplugged 
“Concepcion is broadly written.”
288
  It is not limited in its application 
to federal courts, to its facts, to class action waivers, or even to state un-
conscionability doctrine.  As explained above, such limitations on the 
scope of Concepcion are artificial, because the Court’s analysis in the 
case makes it clear that these were not material considerations, as con-
firmed by the weight of subsequent precedent. 
Numerous courts have recognized that Concepcion added the fun-
damental attributes approach as a third prong to the Court’s test for inval-
idating state law restrictions on arbitration.
289
  For example, the Eleventh 
                                                          
 285.  Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–12 (2013). 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. at 2312. 
 288.  Coneff v. AT & T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 289.  See, e.g., Walker v. BuildDirect.com Techs., Inc., No. 12-6261, 2013 WL 4106341, at *3 
(10th Cir. Aug. 15, 2013).  See also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 685 F.3d 1269, 1277 
(11th Cir. 2012); Coneff, 673 F.3d at 1158 (explaining that “a state court impermissibly relies on the 
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate” when the court “requir[es] arbitration to maintain proce-
dures fundamentally at odds with its very nature” (internal grammatical marks omitted)).  
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Circuit upheld South Carolina’s unconscionability doctrine when it was 
applied to refuse enforcement of an arbitration clause.  First, the court 
held that the South Carolina unconscionability doctrine “applies to arbi-
tration and to other agreements according to the same basic criteria, and 
these criteria do not disproportionately impact arbitration agreements.”
290
  
And second, the court concluded that the unconscionability doctrine 
“does not interfere with fundamental attributes of arbitration as identified 
by the Supreme Court,” and notably, did not sacrifice “procedural infor-
mality that Concepcion recognized as the principal advantage of arbitra-
tion.”
291
  Significantly, the Court in American Express characterized the 
holding in Concepcion in a very broad manner, emphasizing only the 
fundamental attributes portion of the Court’s analysis and thus dispelling 
any notion that the pro-consumer nature of the arbitration agreement or 
other facts in Concepcion were material to that decision.
292
 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONCEPCION: STATE LAW 
Concepcion has emboldened drafters to challenge state statutes, con-
tract defenses, and other common law rules that purportedly interfere 
with the “fundamental attributes of arbitration.”  Courts are just now be-
ginning to address the argument—in a dizzying variety of contexts—that 
the FAA preempts state laws that may render arbitration more formal, 
costlier, or less efficient.  Most courts have read Concepcion as broadly 
as we have.  Thus, few bright lines have emerged to shield state laws 
from a Concepcion-based challenge, as would have been possible under 
a narrower interpretation. 
A.  Consequences for State Law Hostile to Arbitration 
1. State Law Based on Unconscionability 
In determining the enforceability of an arbitration clause, a court ap-
plies ordinary state law principles governing the formation of all con-
tracts
293
 and may refuse to enforce arbitration clauses on the basis of 
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or uncon-
                                                          
 290.  In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 685 F.3d at 1277. 
 291.  Id. at 1279 (internal grammatical marks and citations omitted). 
 292.  Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2311–12. 
 293.  See Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) 
(analyzing California law to determine enforceability based on procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability). 
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scionability.”
294
  While litigants are free to challenge arbitration clauses 
on those and other grounds, we first address the implications of Concep-
cion to state unconscionability doctrine since litigants increasingly rely 
on unconscionability as a basis to challenge arbitration clauses.
295
  Many 
states share certain core unconscionability principles, and therefore, one 
can draw general conclusions about Concepcion’s impact on state uncon-
scionability law despite the nuances of that doctrine among the states. 
Under California law, for instance, any contract term including an 
arbitration clause is unenforceable if it is both procedurally and substan-
tively unconscionable.
296
  This determination requires courts to use “a 
sliding scale”—“‘the more substantively oppressive the contract term, 
the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to 
the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.’”
297
  Both 
forms of unconscionability are required before a court can “exercise its 
discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of 
unconscionability.’”
298
  California unconscionability law, like many oth-
er states, places the burden on the party arguing unconscionability as a 
defense to show its applicability.
299
 
The California Supreme Court’s historic decision in Armendariz v. 
Foundation Health
300
 represents perhaps the most far-reaching applica-
tion of state unconscionability law in the arbitration context.  The court 
in Armendariz crafted a per se rule under which, to be enforceable, an 
arbitration agreement must (1) include a mutual agreement to arbitrate;
301
 
(2) provide for adequate discovery;
302
 (3) not impose costs on the em-
ployee that the employee would not normally bear in court;
303
 (4) provide 
                                                          
 294.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (quoting Doctor’s As-
socs., Inc. v Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)). 
 295.  See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemp-
tion, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 485–86 
(stating that “since 2000, many courts have been refusing to enforce arbitration agreements,” and 
that “[t]he usual ground for such refusals is unconscionability”); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes 
Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability,  52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 194–95 (2004) 
(concluding based on an examination of a certain dataset that in 1982–83, only in one case was an 
arbitration agreement held unconscionable, while in 2002-03, thirty-two arbitration agreements were 
held unconscionable).  
 296.  See Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1746 (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 
Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (2000)). 
 297.  Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  See Higgins v. Super. Ct.,  45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). 
 300.  Armendariz, 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). 
 301.  Id. at 692. 
 302.  Id. at 683. 
 303.  Id. at 687. 
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for selection of a neutral arbitrator;
304




While at least one California court has held that Armendariz remains 
good law after Concepcion,
306
 that court’s analysis was based on the cur-
sory reason that Concepcion did not strike down unconscionability as a 
generally-applicable contract defense.
307
  In effect, the court unconvinc-
ingly side-stepped Concepcion’s preemption analysis, which provides 
that a generally applicable state contract defense such as unconscionabil-
ity is preempted by the FAA if it targets arbitration for disfavored treat-
ment, or presents an obstacle to the fundamental attributes of arbitration.  
As in Concepcion, courts must unpack the basis for the state law uncon-
scionability ruling and determine whether that basis (such as requiring 
adequate discovery) targets arbitration for disfavored treatment or other-
wise interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration.  Therefore, 
aspects of the per se rule in Armendariz likely do not stand up to Con-
cepcion’s underlying reasoning, as discussed more fully below.
308
 
2. State Law Based on Federal Common Law 
In addition to relying on the sources of state law addressed above, 
some courts also have found arbitration agreements unconscionable un-
der state law, relying, oddly enough, on federal common law principles.  
State courts have cited Mitsubishi and Randolph for the proposition that 
a court may refuse to compel arbitration if arbitration costs are so oner-
ous that a litigant effectively would be prevented from pursuing a claim 
under state law (instead of federal law).
309
  Mitsubishi and Randolph 
                                                          
 304. Id. at 682. 
 305.  See, e.g., id. at 683 (concluding that the damages and remedies limitation was “contrary to 
public policy and unlawful”). 
 306.  Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (find-
ing the disputed provision to be “unconscionable and unenforceable under Armendariz”). 
 307.  Id. at 502 (interpreting Concepcion to “reaffirm[] that the FAA ‘permits agreements to 
arbitrate to be invalidated by generally applicable contract defenses, such as . . . unconscionability’” 
(citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011))). 
 308.  See Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, supra note 27, at 1244 (noting that sev-
eral courts have questioned whether portions of the Armendariz rule are still “good law,” because 
“the Armendariz requirements, though couched in terms of unconscionability, cannot be described as 
grounds that ‘exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract’” (quoting James v. Concep-
tus, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1033 (S.D. Tex. 2012))).  
 309.  See, e.g., Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1200 (Wash. 2013) (cit-
ing Randolph in support of the prohibitive-cost defense and concluding that “sufficient evidence was 
presented to make a prima facie case for a prohibitive-cost defense” because the “costs of arbitrating 
in California would exceed [the plaintiff’s] claim” (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 
531 U.S. 79 (2000)); see also Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 680 (citing Mitsubishi for the proposition that, 
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have not been explicitly overruled; however, after Concepcion, state 
court rulings risk preemption by relying on these two cases to refuse to 
enforce an arbitration agreement solely in the context of state law claims. 
Prior to Concepcion, courts were divided over whether Mitsubishi 
and Randolph spoke to the validity of arbitration agreements implicating 
only state law claims.  For example, the Eighth Circuit held that “[a] fee-
splitting arrangement may be unconscionable if information specific to 
the circumstances indicates that fees are cost-prohibitive and preclude 
the vindication of statutory rights in an arbitral forum,” citing Ran-
dolph.
310
  The Eleventh Circuit also purported to employ state uncon-
scionability doctrine but instead relied on the “vindication of statutory 
rights” rationale.
311
  The First Circuit took a slightly different view, ex-
plaining that state unconscionability necessarily includes a vindication of 
rights inquiry, but noting that state law considers additional factors.
312
  
Thus conceived, if an arbitration agreement was unconscionable under 
state contract law, it necessarily would have violated the vindication of 
rights inquiry as well.  By contrast, the Sixth Circuit held that the vindi-
cation of statutory rights doctrine could not inform arbitrability under 
state law whatsoever, as such doctrinal cross-talk would violate the Erie 
doctrine.
313
  Therefore, courts have recognized the considerable overlap 
between state unconscionability law and the vindication of statutory 
rights doctrine, but no uniform analysis emerged in this context. 
Concepcion requires a critical rethinking of precedent that relies on 
the Mitsubishi and Randolph line of cases to hold that cost prohibitive-
ness is a defense to arbitration when only state law claims are at issue.
314
  
While the issue of prohibitive arbitration costs is addressed in greater de-
                                                          
by agreeing to arbitrate a California statutory claim, a party has not agreed to forego rights afforded 
by the statute but only to submit to their resolution in arbitration (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985))).   
 310.  Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2004); accord Murray v. United 
Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2002) (applying unconscion-
ability analysis regarding federal cause of action). 
 311.  Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 877–79 (11th Cir. 2005).  
 312.  Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 60 n.22 (1st Cir. 2006) (“We realize that a state 
unconscionability analysis, based on the particulars of state contract law, may include considerations 
not present in the vindication of statutory rights analysis applied here, which is not dependent on 
state law. However, the unconscionability analysis always includes an element that is the essence of 
the vindication of statutory rights analysis—the frustration of the right to pursue claims granted by 
statute.”). 
 313.  Stutler v. T.K. Constructors Inc., 448 F.3d 343, 345–47 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 314.  See, e.g., In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 355 (Tex. 2008) (brought under a 
Texas statute and citing Randolph for the proposition that courts have “condemned the use of fee-
splitting agreements in employment contracts that have the effect of deterring potential litigants from 
vindicating their statutory rights in an arbitral forum”). 
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tail later, we offer some initial thoughts about why this federal common 
law authority is no longer permissible in the post-Concepcion era for 
FAA preemption purposes. 
First, Mitsubishi and Randolph addressed circumstances in which the 
interest in vindicating a federal statutory right conflicted with the federal 
interest in enforcing arbitration agreements.
315
  In contrast to Concepcion 
or any case involving only state law claims, Mitsubishi and Randolph did 
not raise any FAA preemption issues.  The federal common law princi-
ples in Mitsubishi and Randolph and the obstacle preemption principles 
in Concepcion derive from different sources: the former seek to clarify 




Moreover, state unconscionability law and federal common law are 
not coextensive.
317
  State unconscionability law survives Concepcion and 
American Express, but, as we have noted elsewhere, American Express 
renders the effective vindication of rights doctrine largely toothless.
318
  
Thus, state unconscionability law must require a heightened showing of 
unfairness above and beyond that which was required under the pre-
American Express vindication of rights doctrine. 
Lastly, and most significantly, Concepcion likely upsets courts’ reli-
ance on Mitsubishi and Randolph for the proposition that arbitration 
agreements need not be enforced when state law claims otherwise may 
not be vindicated.
319
  This is because in Concepcion, the Court (1) reject-
ed the proposition that a state can require a procedure inconsistent with 
the FAA even if it might be necessary to ensure the vindication of small-
                                                          
 315.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 652 (1985); cf. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 
556 U.S. 247, 273 (2009). 
 316.  See, e.g., Orman v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7086(DAB), 2012 WL 4039850, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012) (“Indeed, the [federal] vindication of statutory rights doctrine has its ori-
gins in principles of statutory interpretation and is derived from an inference that Congress did not 
intend to preempt rights it had created in other federal statutes when it passed the FAA.  Thus there 
is no principled reason to apply the doctrine to bar arbitration of claims grounded in state laws which 
were not created by Congress.”). 
 317.  E.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 60 n.22. 
 318.  See supra Part I.B.2. 
 319.  See, e.g., Dean v. Draughons Junior Coll., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 751, 762 (M.D. Tenn. 
2013) (because Mitsubishi and Randolph involved “a body of federal substantive law developed by 
the Court specifically to address situations in which the interest in vindicating federal statutory rights 
conflicts with the federal interest in enforcing arbitration agreements,” reliance on these cases in the 
context of state law claims was a defense “not applicable to ‘any’ contract” and thus was preempted 
by Section 2 of the FAA); Orman, 2012 WL 4039850, at *3 (noting that the court “cannot identify 
any cases in which a vindication of statutory rights analysis under the FAA has been applied to state 
statutory claims”). 
 
454 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
dollar state law claims;
320
 and (2) clarified that state courts cannot apply 
even a generally applicable contract defense if applied in a manner that 
discriminates against arbitration.
321
  The cost-prohibitiveness defense is 
not even a generally applicable contract defense because it is framed as a 
specific defense to arbitration.  And in any event, ensuring financially 
reasonable arbitration costs overlaps substantially with the policy, al-
ready rejected by the Court, that ensuring the prosecution of small-dollar 
state law claims is a basis to deviate from the FAA’s purposes.  We 
therefore expect to see the drafter’s argument—that Mitsubishi, Ran-
dolph, and other federal common law cases do not support state court de-
cisions refusing to enforce arbitration agreements—prevail in Concep-
cion’s wake. 
It should be noted, however, that although federal common law may 
not be coextensive with state law, and federal law lacks binding effect 
with respect to purely state law issues, it still may serve as persuasive au-
thority.  The vindication of rights test strikes on public policy themes 
similar to those found in state unconscionability law.  If the First Circuit 
is correct, and federal common law is a logical subset of state uncon-
scionability law, then (a) a decision upholding arbitrability on federal 
common law grounds would be dispositive as to state contract law, and 
(b) a decision denying arbitrability under federal law would be persua-
sive, but not dispositive, authority under state law.
322
 
Given Concepcion’s clear mandate and Randolph’s diminishing sig-
nificance, courts will face the unsavory prospect between finding state 
law preempted or circumventing Concepcion by relying on the gross un-
fairness of the arbitration agreement.  The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision 
in Chavarria v. Ralph’s Grocery Store illustrates the conceptual difficul-
ties in denying a motion to compel arbitration under these circumstanc-
es.
323
  In Chavarria, the agreement at issue—compelled as a basis for 
employment—effectively gave the employer unbridled discretion to se-
lect the arbitrator.
324
  Moreover, the agreement eschewed institutional ar-
bitration rules that provided for a neutral arbitrator.
325
  Finally, the policy 
                                                          
 320.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 321.  Id. at 1748. 
 322.  See Kristian, 446 F.3d at 60 n.22 (“We realize that a state unconscionability analysis, 
based on the particulars of state contract law, may include considerations not present in the vindica-
tion of statutory rights analysis applied here, which is not dependent on state law.  However, the un-
conscionability analysis always includes an element that is the essence of the vindication of statutory 
rights analysis—the frustration of the right to pursue claims granted by statute.”). 
 323.  Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 324.  Id. at 920. 
 325.  Id.  
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required that the arbitrator apportion arbitration fees equally on the par-
ties up front, before resolving the merits of the claims, irrespective of 
state law to the contrary.
326
  The Ninth Circuit panel held that the provi-
sion was unconscionable and that Concepcion did not preempt that appli-
cation of state law.
327
  First, the panel reasoned that the agreement im-
posed prohibitive costs under Randolph.
328
  Second, it found preemption 
inapplicable because state law did not target arbitration for unfavorable 
treatment.
329
  The panel’s analysis, however, is problematic, first and 
foremost, because Randolph is no longer persuasive in the context of 
FAA preemption, as discussed above.  Moreover, the panel ignored that a 
facially neutral state law may still interfere with the FAA’s fundamental 
attributes.  Simply put, it is unclear how Concepcion permits a court to 
deny arbitration even where the provision appears to be unusually harsh. 
B. Recurring State Preemption Issues 
1. State Procedural Law 
Prior to Concepcion, most state courts had rejected various preemp-
tion challenges on the ground that the FAA does not preempt state pro-
cedural law.
330
  Such courts repeatedly held that the FAA does not “re-
quire submission to federal procedural law.”
331
  In other words, “[e]ach 
state is free to apply its own procedural requirements so long as those 
procedures do not defeat the purposes of the act.”
332
  These decisions 
may note, for example, that the FAA does not preempt state procedural 
law because such law “does not go to the essence of the arbitration 
                                                          
 326.  Id. at 920–21. 
 327.  Id. at 927.  
 328.  Id. at 925–26. 
 329.  Id. at 927.  
 330.  See Pierre H. Bergeron, District Courts As Gatekeepers?  A New Vision of Appellate Ju-
risdiction over Orders Compelling Arbitration, 51 EMORY L. J. 1365, 1387–88 (2002) (noting that 
the majority rule in state courts is that the FAA does preempt a neutral state procedural law); see 
also Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L. J. 169, 195 n.86 (2008) 
(noting that most courts follow the rule that state procedural law is not preempted by the FAA). 
 331.  See, e.g., Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge, No. 06-1084, 2012 WL 3870493, at *3 
(Tex. Aug. 17, 2012) (“Although the FAA governs the dispute, federal procedure does not apply in 
Texas courts, even when Texas courts apply the FAA.” (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted)); Scharf v. Kogan, 285 S.W.3d 362, 369 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that because “the FAA 
applies, and we must apply federal law . . . Missouri procedural law applies, so long as the applica-
ble Missouri procedures do not defeat rights granted by Congress”); So. Cal. Edison Co. v. Peabody 
Western Coal, 977 P.2d 769, 773 (Ariz. 1999) (stating the FAA does not “require submission to fed-
eral procedural law”); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988) (recognizing that states 
may establish procedural rules governing litigation in their own courts). 
 332.  So. Cal. Edison Co., 977 P.2d at 773–74. 
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agreement, nor are parties likely to address it in their arbitration agree-
ment.”
333
  By contrast, a minority of courts do not dwell on the sub-
stance–procedure distinction.  Rather, they stress that state rules may 
contravene the purpose and effect of the FAA no matter their classifica-
tion as procedural or substantive. 
The substance–procedure distinction is not useful in the FAA 
preemption context.
334
  Denominating a state law as procedural or sub-
stantive begs the question.  Indeed, as in other contexts, the line between 
procedure and substance is not clean.
335
  Even if, for example, a state law 
rule governing appeals from decisions compelling arbitration is consid-
ered a procedural matter, it has substantive spillover effects.  These spill-
over effects, for instance, may subject a defendant to a significantly 
higher risk of liability.  Such spillover effects may be heightened where 
state law differs from relevant federal law on issues including: the bur-
den of proof, the propriety of a derivative instead of direct action, the 
statute of limitations, punitive damages, abstention pending parallel liti-
gation, and so forth. 
After Concepcion, the substance–procedure distinction is even less 
likely to shield from preemption state laws that impede the purposes of 
the FAA.  For one, the Discover Bank class arbitration rule invalidated in 
Concepcion was arguably procedural, yet this did not factor into the 
                                                          
 333.  Drahozal, supra note 41, at 424.  See also Michael L. Taviss, Comment, Adventures in 
Arbitration: The Appealability Amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 559, 
580–82 (1990) (“[I]t is highly unlikely that section 15 can preempt state arbitration appeals statutes.  
The legislative history stated that the amendment’s purpose was ‘to improve the appellate process in 
the Federal courts of appeals with respect to arbitration.’”); id. at 582 (“The possibility of using state 
courts to circumvent section 15 does not impair the section’s operation. . . . Further, access to state 
appellate courts does not guarantee that the courts will hear the appeal, or that it will succeed.  
Therefore, the state court alternatives do not threaten section 15, and may even reinforce its policy 
goals—increased understanding and acceptance of arbitration.”). 
 334.  See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 39, at 1077 (noting that “[u]nder the FAA counterpart to 
the Erie doctrine, the question becomes not the formal, categorical one of ‘substance’ versus ‘proce-
dure,’” but rather a “functional” analysis of the arbitration clause “in real-world, operational terms”); 
James C. Dunkelberger, Note, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Plight of Health Care Arbi-
tration Agreements under Federal Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1869, 1895 (stating that the distinction 
between substance and procedure on the issue whether a state statute is preempted by the FAA “may 
be wholly academic and redundant”).  
 335.  See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1447 
(2010) (“Instead of a single hard question of whether a Federal Rule regulates substance or proce-
dure, that approach will present hundreds of hard questions, forcing federal courts to assess the sub-
stantive or procedural character of countless state rules that may conflict with a single Federal Rule.  
And it still does not sidestep the problem it seeks to avoid.  At the end of the day, one must come 
face to face with the decision whether or not the state policy (with which a putatively procedural 
state rule may be ‘bound up’) pertains to a ‘substantive right or remedy,’. . . that is, whether it is sub-
stance or procedure.” (internal footnote and citation omitted)).  
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Court’s preemption analysis.
336
 Class actions under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 have been viewed as “arguably procedural” under the Erie 




The majority opinion in Concepcion contained significant clues that 
the Court viewed the Discover Bank rule as a procedural rule.  In fact, 
Justice Scalia framed the threshold issue in this manner: “We consider 
whether the FAA prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of 
certain arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration 
procedures.”
338
  Later, the Court concluded that class arbitration required 
by the Discover Bank rule was “more likely to generate procedural mo-
rass than final judgment.”
339
  Finally, the Court clearly indicated that the 
substance–procedure distinction was not material to the FAA preemption 
analysis by stating that the FAA embodies “a liberal federal policy favor-
ing arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or pro-
cedural policies to the contrary.”
340
 
The Court earlier had suggested in Volt that state procedural rules 
that merely determined the efficient order of proceedings, even resulting 
in delay, did not “undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.”
341
  Alt-
hough Volt technically was not a preemption case, instead turning on en-
forcement of the parties’ agreement, the Court’s dicta gave state courts 
license to invalidate arbitration agreements that failed to comply with 
matters of procedure.  But procedural rules, like substantive rules, can 
and do “interfere[] with fundamental attributes of arbitration” as stated in 
Concepcion, by increasing its formality, or “making it slower or more 
costly.”
342
  Cases like Ferrer and Mastrobuono recognized the point even 
before Concepcion limited Volt by adopting a presumption against con-
struing arbitration agreements to incorporate inefficient state law.
343
  Af-
ter Concepcion, courts and litigants would be well advised to take a cau-
tious approach to the substance–procedure distinction, considering that 
Volt’s reasoning on this point likely no longer remains viable.  In any 
                                                          
 336.  See, e.g., id. at 1437 (“[T]he Court of Appeals held that § 901(b) is ‘substantive’ within the 
meaning of Erie.”). 
 337.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476–78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).   
 338.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 339.  Id. at 1751 (emphasis added). 
 340.  Id. at 1749 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983)). 
 341.  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 
(1989). 
 342.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748, 1751. 
 343.  Id. at 1753. 
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event, rather than relying on the panacea that the FAA does not impact 
state procedural rules, one should consider whether the fundamental at-




2.  Appeals from Arbitration Orders 
Many state laws allow interlocutory appeals after a court has com-
pelled arbitration.  Many other state laws impose procedural require-
ments on parties seeking to appeal a court’s decision refusing to compel 
arbitration.  Both sets of laws are vulnerable after Concepcion.  Indeed, 
one appeals court stated that the issue of whether such laws were 
preempted by the FAA was “likely to recur,” and that such laws “pre-
sent[ed] a conflict” with Concepcion.
345
 
State arbitration statutes are modeled after the 1956 Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act (UAA).  The UAA, however, has “not filled the voids left by the 
FAA in any systematic or consistent fashion.”
346
  There is no dispute that 
both the FAA and the UAA permit an appeal from a court order denying 
a motion to compel arbitration.
347
  That does not mean, however, that the 
FAA and UAA appeal procedures are identical, and whether conflicting 
state laws are preempted by the FAA promises to be a legal battleground. 
Section 16 of the FAA generally does not permit a party to immedi-
ately appeal an order compelling arbitration, unless it is a final order, or 
unless the district court certifies an interlocutory appeal.
348
  In the state 
court context, by contrast, Section 19 of the UAA specifies when an ap-




                                                          
 344.  Concepcion may operate to establish a rule that flips the Erie doctrine rule on its head: a 
state law that is “purely procedural” would not be subject to FAA preemption, but if it is “arguably 
substantive,” FAA preemption would be in play.  Because the Erie doctrine was animated out of 
respect for state law, such a shift would herald an unintended sea change in courts’ approach to fed-
eralism.  
 345.  Wisconsin Auto Title Loans Inc. v. Jones, No. 2011AP2482, 2013 WL 425449 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Feb. 5, 2013) (unpublished certification order to the Wisconsin Supreme Court) (citation omit-
ted).  
 346.  Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Com-
mercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 179 (2002). 
 347.  See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C) (2006); U.A.A. § 19(a)(1) (1956). 
 348.  See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3), (b)(2) (2006); see also In re Pisgah Contractors, Inc., 117 F.3d 
133, 136 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the FAA “contemplate[s] the immediate review of a decision 
favoring arbitration in only two circumstances: (1) when the district court’s order represents ‘a final 
decision with respect to an arbitration,’ and (2) when 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides the means for an 
interlocutory appeal” (internal citations omitted)). 
 349.  See, e.g., U.A.A. § 19 (1956); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.3-28 (2003). 
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With little statutory guidance, UAA jurisdictions are divided on the 
issue of whether orders compelling arbitration are appealable.  Many 
states allow such appeals, presenting a possible conflict with the FAA.
350
  
Others do not, avoiding any potential FAA conflict.
351
 
The weight of authority has held that Section 16 of the FAA does not 
preempt state laws addressing interlocutory appeals.
352
  The majority rule 
relies on the proposition that the FAA does not preempt state procedural 
law.  A minority of jurisdictions have held otherwise—that the FAA does 
preempt state law procedure on interlocutory appeals.
353
 
The distinction between the availability for appeals of orders denying 
                                                          
 350.   See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2101.01 (2003); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1294 
(West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-228 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.20 (West 
2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-418 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.220 (West 2006); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5945 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 18 (West 2004); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 435.440 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.02 (West 2006). 
 351.  See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(1) (West 2011). 
 352.  See, e.g., S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 977 P.2d 769, 773–74 (Ariz. 1999) 
(noting that “[e]ach state is free to apply its own procedural requirements so long as those proce-
dures do not defeat the purposes of the [FAA]”); Am. Gen. Fin. Servs. v. Vereen, 639 S.E.2d 598, 
601 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that an order denying a “motion to compel arbitration is not direct-
ly appealable under [Georgia] procedural law” and that “procedural law is not preempted by the 
FAA”); Simmons Co. v. Deutsche Fin. Servs. Corp., 532 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (hold-
ing that “the FAA does not preempt Georgia procedural law allowing the appeal” of an order com-
pelling arbitration); Saavedra v. Dealmaker Devs., LLC, 8 So.3d 758, 762 (La. Ct. App. 2009) 
(“[W]e find that the FAA does not preclude applying Louisiana procedural law regarding the right to 
appeal an interlocutory judgment denying arbitration.”); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 768 
A.2d 620, 629 (Md. Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]e hold that the Maryland procedural rule, recognizing an 
order compelling arbitration to be a final and appealable judgment, is not preempted by the FAA.”); 
Weston Secs. Corp. v. Aykanian, 703 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that the 
“Massachusetts procedural rule depriving [parties] of an immediate appeal from the judge’s order 
compelling [arbitration]” does not “undermine[] the Federal goal of enforcing agreements to arbi-
trate in State and Federal courts”); McClellan v. Barrath Constr. Co. Inc., 725 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the FAA would not preempt a Missouri law allowing an appeal of an 
order compelling arbitration, “provided [Missouri Law] do[es] nothing to thwart the substantive 
rights granted in the federal act”); Scottish Re Life Corp. v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 
647 S.E.2d 102, 107 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (Geer, J., concurring) (“[T]he FAA does not preempt state 
law governing appeals relating to arbitrations.”); In re D. Wilson Const. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 780 
(Tex. 1996) (holding that “the FAA does not preempt” the Texas law allowing for interlocutory ap-
peals of orders issued under the FAA). 
 353.  See, e.g., Superpumper, Inc. v. Nerland Oil, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 647, 651 (N.D. 1998) (con-
sidering “the procedural requirements of the FAA in deciding whether an order compelling arbitra-
tion is appealable under [North Dakota law]”); Berger Farms v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 939 P.2d 
64, 69 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the FAA preempted the statute at issue because the FAA 
“expressly provides for immediate appeals from trial court orders denying motions to stay litigation 
pending arbitration,” but “Oregon procedural law prohibits such appeals”), rev’d, 995 P.2d 1159 (Or. 
2000), overruled,  Bush v. Paragon Prop., Inc., 997 P.2d 882, 887 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that 
“[w]hether or not Congress intended to require state courts to provide interlocutory appellate review 
of orders denying arbitration when state law does not permit them to conduct that review, it is consti-
tutionally prohibited from imposing that requirement”); Dakota Wesleyan Univ. v. HPG Int’l, Inc., 
560 N.W.2d 921, 922 (S.D. 1997) (“[W]e turn to the FAA for guidance in determining whether the 
circuit court’s order to compel arbitration is appealable.”). 
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arbitration, and of those compelling arbitration, is grounded in the “na-
tional policy favoring arbitration,” and the fact that a “prime objective” 
of arbitration is to achieve “expeditious results.”
354
  Therefore, while an 
immediate appeal of a decision denying a motion to compel arbitration is 
necessary to ensure the benefits of arbitration are not lost in their asser-
tion,
355
 an appeal of a decision compelling arbitration “creates yet anoth-
er layer of review, which again delays all other proceedings” and “runs 
contrary to the principles of efficiency in . . . the FAA . . . .”
356
 
After Concepcion, state laws that impose procedural requirements 
that are inconsistent with the FAA—whether for appeals of orders deny-
ing or compelling arbitration—appear suspect.  To appeal an order deny-
ing arbitration, some states provide only a discretionary appeal,
357
 
whereas the FAA provides an appeal of right.
358
  The FAA may preempt 
the state rule in this situation.  Impeding secondary review of a denial of 
arbitration delays arbitration in many circumstances where the parties’ 
intent is clear, and can defeat the benefits of arbitration entirely. 
As discussed above, state procedural law is not automatically im-
mune from preemption, and it is probably irrelevant that the timing of 
appeals is often considered procedural.  Indeed, the Concepcion majority 
never mentioned, let alone relied on, the substance–procedure distinc-




More importantly, in reasoning why the Discover Bank rule erected 
an obstacle to the FAA’s objectives, the Court in Concepcion heavily re-
lied on the costs of appealing a class certification decision.  The Court 
noted that “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class liti-
gation,” where “a defendant may appeal a certification decision on an in-
terlocutory basis and, if unsuccessful, may appeal from a final judgment 
as well.”
360
  By contrast, the Court stated that “‘[i]n bilateral arbitration, 
parties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in 
order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, 
greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators 
                                                          
 354.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 355.  See Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting 
that “Congress acknowledged that one of the principal benefits of arbitration” is “swift access to 
appellate review”).   
 356.  Polina Kushelev, Note, An International Approach to Breaking the Core of the Bankrupt-
cy Code and FAA Conflict, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 355, 368 (2012). 
 357.  See, e.g., Saavedra, 8 So.3d at 762. 
 358.  9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
 359.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 360.  Id. at 1752. 
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to resolve specialized disputes.’”
361
  Accordingly, the Court found that 
class actions were poorly suited to the arbitration context, in part because 
of a defendant’s ability to appeal at both the interlocutory and final 
judgment stages, thereby increasing the procedural difficulty and finan-
cial feasibility of the litigation.
362
 
The above passage in Concepcion is potentially devastating for state 
rules on appeals from arbitration orders, where such rules are not con-
sistent with the FAA.  The Court essentially suggested that interlocutory 
appeals delaying arbitration, in and of themselves, may run afoul of the 
policies underpinning the FAA.  If class actions contravene the goals of 
arbitration because they bog the parties down in time-sucking interlocu-
tory appeals, then state rules permitting appeals of orders compelling ar-
bitration necessarily would violate the same policies. 
For that reason, the Georgia Supreme Court’s post-Concepcion deci-
sion in American General Financial Services v. Jape,
363
 rests on shaky 
footing.  That case concerned Georgia laws that only permitted appeals 
from orders denying arbitration if they complied with state interlocutory 
appeal procedures.
364
  Those laws, the court held, were procedural rules 
that were not preempted by the FAA because they determined “‘only the 
efficient order of proceedings’” and therefore did “‘not affect the en-
forceability of the . . . agreement itself.’”
365
  But Jape ignores Concep-
cion’s strong suggestion that the “efficient order of proceedings”
366
 was 
relevant in deciding questions of preemption.  Indeed, several judges 
who concurred in that decision on other grounds recognized “there is 
considerably more tension than the majority opinion admits between 
Georgia’s interlocutory appeal statute . . . and the FAA’s direct appeal 
provision . . . .”
367
  Therefore, while we are aware of no post-Concepcion 
holding that the FAA preempts state rules governing appeals of arbitra-
tion orders,
368
 it is well recognized that Concepcion has fundamentally 
                                                          
 361.  Id. at 1751 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 
(2010)). 
 362.  Id. at 1752 (“In litigation, a defendant may appeal a certification decision on an interlocu-
tory basis and, if unsuccessful, may appeal from a final judgment as well.”). 
 363.  732 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. 2012). 
 364.  See id. at 747.  
 365.  Id. at 750 (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996)). 
 366.  See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749. 
 367.  Jape, 732 S.E.2d at 751 (Nahmias, J., concurring specially).   
 368.  See, e.g., Id. at 750 (majority opinion); Cnty. of Haw. v. Unidev, LLC, No. CAAP-11-
0000019, 2011 WL 4998491 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2011) (holding post-Concepcion that “an order 
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Wisconsin Supreme Court the question of whether “an order denying a motion to compel arbitration 
 
 
462 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
changed the calculus of this issue. 
3. Discovery 
To illustrate the concept of FAA obstacle preemption, the Concep-
cion majority opined that a state rule requiring “judicially monitored dis-
covery” would be self-evidently preempted under the FAA.
369
  That is 
because, “[i]n practice,” such a rule “would have a disproportionate im-
pact on arbitration agreements” even if “it would presumably apply to 
contracts purporting to restrict discovery in litigation as well.”
370
  Even 
the dissent apparently agreed that the FAA preempted such a rule.
371
 
Although the Supreme Court spoke of “judicially monitored discov-
ery,”
372
 the judicially monitored modifier is not necessary for the discov-
ery example to pose preemption problems.  After all, any discovery base-
lines imposed by state statute or common law rule, whether monitored by 
court or arbitrator, would disproportionately affect arbitration, because 
discovery in federal and state court is a process already governed by fed-
eral and state rules of civil procedure, respectively.  Moreover, limited 
discovery indisputably furthers the aims of efficiency, informality, and 
lower costs.  Therefore, it appears that all discovery limitations are vul-
nerable—including Armendariz’s requirement of “adequate discov-
ery”
373
—under the reasoning offered by the Concepcion majority, as 
suggested in a number of post-Concepcion cases.
374
  Those cases, how-
ever, upheld either institutional arbitration rules or ad hoc rules that per-
mitted limited discovery. 
The only remaining question then is whether a defendant may cate-
                                                          
[is] immediately appealable as a ‘final’ order under [Wisconsin law] or the Federal Arbitration 
Act”). 
 369.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. 
 370.  Id. 
 371.  See id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “class arbitration is consistent with 
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 372.  Id. at 1747 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 373.  Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 683 (Cal. 2000). 
 374.  See, e.g., Lucas v. Hertz Corp., No. C 11–01581 LB, 2012 WL 5199384, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 22, 2012) (“Concepcion . . . suggests that limitations on arbitral discovery no longer support a 
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Supp. 2d 1002, 1015–16 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (FINRA discovery rule applied); Valle v. Lowe’s HIW, 
Inc., No. 11–1489 SC, 2011 WL 3667441, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011) (AAA discovery rule 
applied); Pilitz v. Bluegreen Corp., No. 6:11–cv–388–Orl–19KRS, 2011 WL 3359641, at *5 (M.D. 
Fla. Aug. 4, 2011) (applying rules that limit the discovery period to sixty days and allow only three 
depositions, twenty interrogatories, and fifteen requests for documents per side); Hopkins v. World 
Acceptance Corp., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1349–50 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (AAA). 
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gorically insulate itself by barring all discovery in the arbitration agree-
ment in the name of efficiency and arbitration autonomy.  At least one 
court has indicated that such blanket prohibitions are permissible.
375
  But 
another court has held that the same arbitration agreement was substan-
tively unconscionable, because one party would have been required to 
“articulate its arguments with a clarity bordering on prescience, for it has 
no right to discovery and will have no opportunity to rebut the [other] 
party’s response . . . .”
376
 
The Tierra court, which upheld a categorical ban on discovery, may 
have over-read existing FAA preemption jurisprudence.  There is a key 
difference between limiting discovery and eliminating it, and the benefits 
of limiting discovery do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that elimi-
nating discovery altogether also serves the aims of arbitration.  And Con-
cepcion might be read to permit some discovery.  Although institutional 
arbitration rules impose limits on discovery, we are not aware of any that 
categorically ban discovery.  In light of Concepcion’s reliance on institu-
tional rules to divine the “fundamental nature” of arbitration, agreements 
that prohibit discovery altogether may themselves be considered incon-
sistent with the nature of arbitration. 
4. Confidentiality 
State decisions, which have invalidated confidentiality provisions in 
arbitration clauses as unconscionable, are also suddenly vulnerable in 
light of Concepcion.  The Court described confidentiality as a feature—
not a bug—of the arbitration process.
377
  Indeed, class-wide procedures 
are purportedly incompatible with arbitration “as a structural matter,” in 
part, because “[c]onfidentiality becomes more difficult.”
378
  One might 
conclude from this passage that the Court deemed confidentiality as an 
essential feature of arbitration.  Elsewhere, however, the Court appears to 
use more modest language, touting confidentiality as a benefit that par-
ties could choose for themselves.
379
 
                                                          
 375.  See Tierra Right of Way Servs., Ltd. v. Abengoa Solar Inc., No. CV–11–00323–PHX–
GMS, 2011 WL 2292007, at *5 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2011) (enforcing prohibition on discovery or doc-
ument production). 
 376.  Unimax Express, Inc. v. Cosco N. Am., Inc., No. CV 11–02947 DDP (PLAx), 2011 WL 
5909881, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2011). 
 377.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749–50. 
 378.  Id. at 1750. 
 379.  See id. at 1749 (“The point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration process-
es is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.  It can be specified, 
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Assume that a contract includes an arbitration clause, which requires 
that “neither party may disclose the existence, content, or results of any 
arbitration or award.”  If the contract is one of adhesion between a large 
corporate entity and its customers, the Ninth Circuit and several other ju-
risdictions have held that such a confidentiality provision necessarily re-
sults in unfairness to the customer, even though it is facially neutral.
380
 
This argument, where it has found traction, is based on the following 
rationale: a company will tend to be a repeat player in arbitration arising 
out of disputes under the contract—for example, with its customers—
whereas each customer will likely only be a one-time participant in arbi-
tration, if he or she becomes a participant at all.  As a repeat player, the 
company will be able to “accumulate a wealth of knowledge about arbi-
trators, legal issues, and tactics,”
381
 including which arguments were held 
to be meritorious before certain arbitrators.  While the Ninth Circuit in 
Ting originally found that the advantages of AT&T’s repeat player-status 
were “particularly harmful” where its contract affected seven million 
Californians,
382
 subsequently, that court also held that a company could 
garner such an unfair advantage even where the company contracted with 
hundreds or thousands of potential claimants.
383
 
The concern over confidentiality provisions in arbitrations, however, 
is not uniformly shared.  The Third Circuit challenged the premise that 
any individual plaintiff has been treated unfairly as a result of such a 
confidentiality provision.
384
  That court concluded that confidentiality 
provisions in arbitration agreements could not result in unfairness be-
tween the contracting parties, but instead could only make it more diffi-
cult for potential plaintiffs in future cases to be successful in arbitra-
tion.
385
  Accordingly, because the unconscionability doctrine “seeks to 
                                                          
for example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings be kept 
confidential to protect trade secrets.”). 
 380.  See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Pokorny v. 
Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 1002 (9th Cir. 2010) (characterizing a confidentiality provision as one 
that “unfairly favors Quixtar because it prevents Plaintiffs from discussing their claims with other 
potential plaintiffs and from discovering relevant precedent to support their claims”).   
 381.  McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 858 (Wash. 2008) (en banc) (internal grammatical 
marks omitted).   
 382.  Ting, 319 F.3d at 1151–52. 
 383.  See Davis v. O’Melveny & Myers, 485 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 
“Ting’s concern was not limited strictly to potential claims by millions of ‘repeat players’” because 
“[the employer] ha[d] placed itself in a far superior legal posture . . . while, at the same time, [the 
employer] accumulate[d] a wealth of knowledge on how to negotiate the terms of its own unilateral-
ly crafted contract”). 
 384.  See, e.g., Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 280 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 385.  Id. 
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prevent substantial unfairness between contracting parties having grossly 
unequal bargaining power,” the court held that confidentiality provisions 
that impose the same rights and restraints on each of the contracting par-
ties are enforceable.
386
  Some state courts have agreed that, so long as the 
confidentiality provision itself is “even-handed,” a confidentiality provi-
sion in an arbitration agreement does not weigh in favor of finding the 
agreement unconscionable.
387
  And still other courts, such as the D.C. 
Circuit, have acknowledged the potential for unfairness due to a compa-
ny’s repeat player status, but found that it would be offset because arbi-




One case in particular epitomizes the vulnerability of the state laws 
that hold that confidentiality provisions in arbitration agreements are un-
conscionable after Concepcion.  The Supreme Court of Kentucky in 
Schnuerle v. Insight Communications Company considered whether a 
class action ban, a class arbitration ban, and a confidentiality provision, 
all contained in an arbitration agreement, were enforceable.
389
  The court 
first concluded, relying on Concepcion, that the class action and class ar-
bitration ban contained in the arbitration agreement were not uncon-
scionable, and must be given effect.
390
  Next, the court considered 
whether “Concepcion prevents state courts from disturbing confidentiali-
ty agreements included within arbitration agreements.”
391
  This court re-
jected this application of Concepcion.
392
 
Although the Schnuerle court noted Concepcion’s dicta that 
“[c]onfidentiality becomes more difficult” under class-wide arbitration, it 
was not convinced that the Court affirmatively indicated “that confiden-
tiality agreements are likewise protected under [Concepcion’s] hold-
ing.”
393
  Rather, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ting and other 
cases, the Schneurle court concluded that the arbitration agreement’s 
confidentiality provision was unconscionable, “although facially neu-
tral,” because it “in effect” favored the defendant corporation.
394
 
In our view, the Kentucky court’s decision does not fully appreciate 
                                                          
 386.  Id. at 279–80. 
 387.  See, e.g., Livingston v. Metro. Pediatrics, LLC, 227 P.3d 796, 809 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).  
 388.  See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997).   
 389.  376 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Ky. 2012).   
 390.  Id. at 573–74. 
 391.  Id. at 578. 
 392.  Id. 
 393.  Id. at 578 n.14 (internal grammatical marks omitted) (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).  
 394.  Id. at 579. 
 
466 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
Concepcion’s preemption analysis.  It is well recognized that confidenti-
ality is a principal advantage of arbitration.
395
  Invalidating confidentiali-
ty provisions through state unconscionability law effectively rewrites 
terms that contracting parties have agreed to and undermines the benefit 
of the bargain they have struck. 
Similarly, procedural informality of arbitration is widely viewed as a 
principal advantage of arbitration,
396
 and the Court in Concepcion 
agreed.
397
  However, by holding that class action waivers were uncon-
scionable, the Discover Bank rule invalidated terms in which the custom-
er had agreed not to join his claims with those of others.
398
  Class arbitra-
tions clearly do require a greater degree of procedural formality and also 
are less efficient in resolving disputes than a bilateral arbitration.  The 
Supreme Court held that the Discover Bank rule thus interfered with ar-
bitration by causing it to “sacrifice[] the principal advantage of arbitra-
tion—its informality—and make[] the process slower, more costly, and 
more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”
399
 
The Court could just as easily have held that state laws barring con-
fidentiality agreements interfere with one of the principal advantages of 
arbitration, and that such laws unfairly target arbitration.  It is no secret 
that the Court considered confidentiality to be one of the principal ad-
vantages of arbitration, alongside the parties’ discretion to design their 
own efficient and streamlined procedures.
400
  In Concepcion, the Court 
stated approvingly, albeit in dicta, that in an arbitration agreement, “[i]t 
can be specified . . . that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the relevant 
field, or that the proceedings be kept confidential to protect trade se-
                                                          
 395.  See, e.g., Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced Legis-
lative Response, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361, 364 (2010) (noting that “[r]ecognized benefits of arbitration 
include confidentiality, speed, and party autonomy”); Christopher R. Drahozal, Business Courts and 
the Future of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 507 (2009) (“[A]rbitration retains 
some of its advantages over litigation (such as choice of decision maker and confidentiality).”); S.I. 
Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy 
Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 45 (2008) (writing that confidentiality “is one of the long-
enunciated benefits of arbitration”).   
 396.  See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Rec-
onciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 
IND. L.J. 591, 597 (2001) (writing that “[c]laimed benefits of arbitration are that it offers a more in-
formal, less expensive, and efficient forum for resolving disputes”); Bruce L. Benson, An Explora-
tion of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the Development of Arbitration in the United 
States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 482 (1995) (noting that “the benefits of arbitration are widely 
recognized to include . . . fast, informal, and inexpensive dispute resolution”). 
 397.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748–49 (2011). 
 398.  Id. at 1746. 
 399.  Id. at 1750–51. 
 400.  Id. at 1749. 
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crets.”
401
  Moreover, given the presumption that court proceedings are 
open to the public, rules barring such confidentiality agreements will 
disproportionately affect arbitration.  It therefore appears that the contin-
ued applicability of state rules finding confidentiality provisions uncon-




5. Cost Splitting 
Courts frequently address the unconscionability of cost-splitting pro-
visions, which may shift prohibitive costs onto the more vulnerable par-
ty.  While in the past courts were given a wide berth to find arbitration 
agreements unenforceable on such grounds, Concepcion appears to mar-
shal in a new era which would place significantly greater restraints on 
courts’ ability to consider allegedly prohibitive arbitration costs uncon-
scionable. 
Courts frequently rely on Randolph in determining whether an arbi-
tration agreement is unenforceable for imposing prohibitive arbitration 
costs or including other suspect cost-shifting provisions.
403
  In Randolph, 
the consumer argued that “the arbitration agreement’s silence with re-
spect to costs and fees creates a ‘risk’ that she will be required to bear 
prohibitive arbitration costs if she pursues her claims in an arbitral fo-
rum, and thereby forces her to forego any claims she may have against 
[the company].”
404
  The Court was not sympathetic to her argument be-
cause she had not met her burden of showing that the arbitration agree-
ment should be invalidated due to prohibitive arbitration costs.
405
  How-
ever, the Court also wrote that “[i]t may well be that the existence of 
large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vin-
dicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”
406
 
The Court’s concern about the potentially excessive costs of arbitra-
tion may appear at odds with the congressionally-declared “national pol-
icy favoring arbitration,”
407
 a point not lost on commentators.  After all, 
                                                          
 401.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 402.  But see Kanbar v. O’Melveny & Myers, 849 F. Supp. 2d 902, 909 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (find-
ing that confidentiality provisions in “arbitration agreements are still subject to unconscionablility 
analysis,” even following Concepcion and thus implying that they can still be unconscionable). 
 403.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89–92 (2000). 
 404.  Id. at 90. 
 405.  Id. at 91–92. 
 406.  Id. at 90. 
 407.  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).  
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the Court has recognized that arbitration is a private means of dispute 
resolution.
408
  And, the funding required to resolve disputes with a pri-
vate third-party neutral, instead of a judge, will almost invariably come 
from the parties themselves.
409
  While litigants are not responsible for the 
expenses of the judge, they are generally responsible for covering court 
costs (i.e., attorney fees, filing fees, transcript costs, etc.),
410
 and the high 
costs of litigation often discourage aggrieved parties from seeking to 
vindicate their rights. 
To the extent that a court is protective of a party’s ability to pursue 
his claims in arbitration without financial hardship, even though a simi-
larly-situated individual would not receive such protections in litigation, 
the court risks discriminating against arbitration in a manner contrary to 
the purposes underlying the FAA.  According to one commentator, “the 
costs rationale for finding unconscionability may be based upon on false 
premises.  In any event, this rationale fails to distinguish arbitration from 
litigation while preferring litigation as a standard for judging arbitration 




After Randolph, courts “generally adopted a case-by-case determina-
tion” of whether an arbitration agreement imposes excessive costs, con-
sidering factors such as “the claimant’s ability to pay, the difference be-
tween costs of litigation and arbitration, and the likelihood that the cost 
of arbitration will deter the bringing of claims.”
412
  Two general ap-
proaches developed.  The Fourth Circuit, which was the first circuit to 
consider the issue of prohibitive arbitration costs after Randolph, under-
took “a costs comparison between arbitration and litigation as a 
whole,”
413
 which could be analyzed with reference to these factors.
414
  
However, the Sixth Circuit considered that the issue should not be so fo-
cused on the individual claimant, but upon whether the difference in the 
                                                          
 408.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (“The ‘principal 
purpose’ of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to 
their terms.’” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)). 
 409.  See, e.g., Burton, supra note 295, at 493 (noting that the costs of dispute resolution “gen-
erally are cheaper in arbitration [than litigation] though the parties must pay filing fees and the arbi-
trator’s fee”); see also id. at 494 (writing that “the costs of litigation discourage plaintiffs, too”). 
 410. E.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717–18 (1967) 
(recognizing the American rule that each side bears their costs in litigation). 
 411.  Burton, supra note 295, at 493. 
 412.  Randall, supra note 295, at 200. 
 413.  Dan O’Hearn, Beyond “Let Them Eat Cake”: An Argument for the Armendariz Method of 
Cost Allocation in Mandatory Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 541, 
549 (2007). 
 414.  Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001).  
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cost of arbitration and litigation was so substantial as to deter the bring-
ing of comparable claims.
415
  With this end in mind, the Sixth Circuit al-
so considered “the likelihood that similarly situated plaintiffs would be 
deterred from bringing a claim due to prohibitive costs.”
416
  Courts there-
fore have not developed a consistent approach to considering whether the 
costs of arbitration are excessive. 
In the aftermath of Concepcion, judicial attempts to strike down arbi-
tration agreements on the basis of allegedly excessive arbitration costs 
will likely be reined in.  Concepcion emphasized that a state law rule that 
in theory is based on “the general principle of unconscionability or pub-
lic-policy disapproval of exculpatory agreements” cannot “have a dis-
proportionate impact on arbitration agreements.”
417
  The manner in 
which several courts have reasoned that allegedly excessive arbitration 
costs are unconscionable appears to do just that. 
A brief discussion of two decisions illuminates the potential ways in 
which courts could consider arbitration costs.  First, based on a Califor-
nia state law rule, the Ninth Circuit held that an arbitration clause was 
unconscionable where (a) the employee was responsible for paying the 
$125 initial filing fee; (b) the employer was responsible for paying the 
first day of hearing costs; and (c) the parties otherwise shared all arbitra-
tion costs.
418
  In that case, the Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that “the only 
valid fee provision is one in which an employee is not required to bear 
any expense beyond what would be required to bring the action in 
court.”
419
  This statement may appear to be facially neutral, in that it re-
quires the costs to the claimant to be equal, whether the claim is pursued 
in arbitration or litigation. 
That being so, this rule is not on firm footing following Concepcion.  
First and foremost, state courts likely cannot use Randolph offensively to 
strike down arbitration clauses under state law.
420
  Moreover, such a rule 
could never be generally applicable.  The fact that the parties have 
agreed to arbitration presupposes that the costs of the arbitrator must be 
borne, in some division, by the parties.  California therefore has adopted 
a per se rule that an arbitration agreement will only pass the unconscion-
ability test where the costs to the claimant are not greater than would be 
                                                          
 415.  Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Bradford, 
238 F.3d at 556). 
 416.  O’Hearn, supra note 413, at 550 (citing Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663–65) (emphasis added). 
 417.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct., 1740, 1747 (2011). 
 418.  Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 419.  Id. at 786. 
 420.  See supra notes 314–27 and accompanying text. 
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incurred in litigation, even though, by virtue of the fact that the parties 
agreed to arbitration, additional costs (i.e., those of the arbitrator) must 
be incurred.
421
  Thus, an arbitration agreement would be unconscionable 
if the claimant would be required to shoulder some portion of these addi-
tional, necessarily incurred costs. 
The California rule specifically conditions the enforceability of an 
arbitration agreement on whether one party to that agreement (i.e., the 
employer) agrees to certain costs that would only be incurred in arbitra-
tion.  Although this state law contract defense is an application of uncon-
scionability that is facially neutral by requiring the costs of arbitration 
and litigation to the claimant to be equal, such a rule would have a dis-
proportionate impact upon arbitration agreements.  Therefore, the FAA 




Another approach to determining whether an arbitration agreement is 
not enforceable on the basis of excessive arbitration costs was articulated 
by the Alaska Supreme Court in Gibson.
423
 In that case, an employee ar-
gued that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable because he was 
expected to be apportioned fifty percent of the arbitration costs for his 
claim under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA).
424
  While the arbi-
tration agreement itself was silent on the issue of costs, the court took no-
tice of the parties’ expectation of a “fifty/fifty split,” and the fact that ar-
bitration costs in such a case could easily exceed $6,000.
425
 
The court found that a “wage and hour” claimant, such as the em-
ployee in Gibson, who was seeking unpaid overtime compensation for 
work performed over the course of several years, would only be required 
to pay $150 in “forum costs” to have his or her claim adjudicated in 
court.
426
  This figure stood in stark contrast to the “uncertain but much 
greater forum costs for which Gibson would be liable in arbitration.”
427
  
Because the AWHA contained provisions “designed to deter employers 
from violating the act and to encourage employees to take action to rem-
                                                          
 421.  Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs, Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 687. See also supra notes 
416–17 and accompanying text. 
 422.  See also Randall, supra note 295, at 209 (arguing that the California state-law rule that 
employers must be required to pay all costs unique to arbitration, is a “per se approach . . . [that] 
conflicts with the basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, to place arbitration agreements on the 
same footing as other contracts” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 423.  Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091 (Alaska 2009). 
 424.  Id. at 1099. 
 425.  Id. 
 426.  Id. at 1099. 
 427.  Id. 
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edy violations,” the Gibson court held that “[i]mposing substantial forum 
costs would run counter to” that purpose.
428
 
The inquiry in Gibson, much like the California rule, considers the 
comparative costs of filing the claim in arbitration and litigation.  Both 
tests find the arbitration agreements at issue to be unconscionable based 
on potentially excessive costs to the claimant, and both tests use a com-
parative costs approach to reach that conclusion.  The difference is that 
Gibson also considered the potential total costs to the claimant, the type 
of claim, and the potential recovery.
429
  By addressing the issue of exces-
sive costs by looking at the totality of circumstances (including the 
claimant’s ability to pay) rather than dictating at the outset the division of 
costs for parties who agreed to resolve their disputes in arbitration, the 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach appears to be a sounder basis up-
on which courts can determine whether the costs of arbitration are exces-
sive, under the Court’s reasoning in Randolph.  However, courts could 
also find this approach to be preempted by the FAA as well.  After all, 
Concepcion, as interpreted in American Express, unequivocally held that 
the FAA’s “command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps any in-
terest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.”
430
  That admoni-
tion is equally relevant to the argument that a party is prevented from 
vindicating his or her rights as a result of high arbitration costs, as in 
Randolph, and based on the high cost of obtaining an expert witness, as 
in American Express. 
6. Forum Selection Clauses 
Another well-trod question is whether forum selection clauses are 
unenforceable under state law and if so, whether the FAA preempts the 
state rule.  The Supreme Court has long held that forum selection clauses 
are generally enforceable under federal common law unless, among other 
things, “enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the fo-
rum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial 
decision.”
431
  In their merits brief to the Court, the plaintiffs in Concep-
                                                          
 428.  Id. 
 429.  Id. at 1098–99. 
 430.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2401, 2312 n.5 (2010) (citing AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752–53 (2011)). 
 431.  M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972), superseded by statute, 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1404 (West 2013), as recognized in Outokumpu Eng’g Enters., Inc. v. Kvaerner Envi-
roPower, Inc., 685 A.2d 724, 734 n.6 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596 (1991). 
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cion argued that preemption of the Discover Bank rule would topple the 
Court’s well-settled jurisprudence regarding forum selection clauses.
432
  
This argument is an overstatement.  As it stands, the majority of cases 
addressing the issue have held that the FAA preempts state laws restrict-
ing forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements.  Concepcion does 
not alter, but in fact, reinforces, the majority rule. 
Generally speaking, there are two primary ways to invalidate a forum 
selection clause: state franchise statutes and common law unconsciona-
bility.  Several decisions predating Concepcion invalidated arbitration 
agreements for including clauses that required arbitration in distant juris-
dictions.
433
  State franchise statutes, many of which are modeled after the 
Uniform Securities Act, sometimes include anti-waiver provisions that 







 and South Carolina,
437
 have general statutes making all fo-
rum selection clauses against the state’s public policy.
438
  State courts in-
terpreting these statutes often have invalidated forum selection clauses. 
Consider South Carolina’s statute, which shows the attention that ar-
bitration agreements receive under these statutes.  The South Carolina 
statute generally prohibits forum selection clauses in one section, and 
specifically addresses arbitration forum-selection clauses in another.  
Courts have held that the FAA preempts the first but not the second.
439
  
                                                          
 432.  See Brief for Respondents at 28, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, No. 
09-893 (2011), 2010 WL 4411292 (“The principle that ‘[f]orum selection clauses contained in 
form . . . contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness’ and may be ‘con-
demn[ed] . . . as against public policy,’ applies equally to arbitration clauses.” (quoting Carnival 
Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595) (citing Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 
U.S. 528, 539 (1995))). 
 433.  See, e.g., Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1287–92 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
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 434.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20040.5 (West 1994), preempted by Bradley v. Harris Re-
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 435.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-28.1-14 (West 2013).  
 436.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (West 2009), preempted by Chambers v. Montana Con-
tractors Ass’n Health Care Trust, 797 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 (D. Mont. 2009) (holding that ERISA 
preempted § 28-2-708). 
 437.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-7-120 (1990), preempted by Tritech Elec., Inc. v. Frank M. Hall & 
Co., 540 S.E.2d 864, 866 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the FAA preempted § 15-7-120). 
 438.  See, e.g., Spinks v. Krystal Co., No. 6:07-2619-HMH, 2007 WL 2822788, at *3 (D. S.C. 
Sept. 26, 2007) (stating that § 15-7-120 provided “evidence of a strong public policy in South Caro-
lina of non-enforcement of a forum selection clause that would deprive a South Carolina litigant of 
his choice of forum”); Montana ex rel. Polaris Indus., Inc. v. Dist. Court of the Thirteenth Judicial 
Dist., 695 P.2d 471, 473 (Mont. 1985) (Sheehy, J., specially concurring) (noting that § 28-2-708 
“states a public policy . . . [that] makes forum-selection clauses in contracts in our state void”). 
 439.  Consol. Insured Benefits, Inc. v. Conseco Med. Ins., Co., 370 F. Supp. 2d 397, 402 (D. 
S.C. 2004); see also Tritech Elec., Inc. v. Frank M. Hall & Co., 540 S.E.2d 864, 866 (S.C. Ct. App. 
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Although the South Carolina statute itself is silent on the issue, courts 




In addition to state franchise statutes, the common law of uncon-
scionability provides another avenue to invalidate forum selection claus-
es.  The majority of courts have held that such decisions are preempted 
by the FAA.
441
















have ruled that forum selection clauses in arbitration agreements are un-
enforceable under the FAA because they are unconscionable. 
Keystone is the leading example of the minority rule.  At issue were 
two Montana statutes voiding
449
 out-of-state forum-selection clauses.
450
  
The Montana Supreme Court reasoned that the statutes did “not conflict 
with the FAA” because they did not single out arbitration clauses.
451
  As 
they were written in arbitration-neutral terms, they applied to both arbi-
                                                          
2000) (holding that FAA preempted South Carolina statute precluding enforcement of arbitration 
agreements that provided for arbitration proceedings outside of South Carolina). 
 440.  Ins. Prods. Mktg., Inc. v. Indianapolis Life Ins. Co., 176 F. Supp. 2d 544, 550 (D. S.C. 
2001). 
 441.  See, e.g., Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2001); Gill v. 
World Inspection Network Int’l, Inc., No. 06CV3187(JFB)(MLO), 2006 WL 2166821 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 31, 2006); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Hamilton, 150 F.3d 157, 163–64 (2d Cir. 1998) (enforcing 
arbitral forum selection clause after concluding that unconscionability defense did not overcome 
presumptive enforceability under the FAA), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1103 (1999); see also Mgmt. Re-
cruiters Int’l v. Bloor, 129 F.3d 851, 856 (6th Cir. 1997); Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409, 418 (7th 
Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 442.  See, e.g., Wilmot v. McNabb, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209 (N.D. Cal. 2003); see also 
Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 443.  See, e.g., Domingo v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 70 F. App’x 919 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 444.  See, e.g., Plattner v. Edge Solutions Inc., No. 03-CV-2646, 2004 WL 1575557, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2004). 
 445.  See, e.g., Hagedorn v. Veritas Software Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d 857, 862 (S.D. Ohio 
2002); but see Lindsey v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., No. 19903, 2003 WL 22972357 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 19, 2003) (holding that a forum selection clause in an arbitration agreement was not uncon-
scionable where plaintiff failed to demonstrate financial inability to travel to the designated forum). 
 446.  See, e.g., Wilder v. Absorption Corp., 107 S.W.3d 181, 185 (Ky. 2003). 
 447.  See, e.g., Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (holding 
that even though the FAA governs arbitration agreements, “[Missouri] courts will not enforce claus-
es selecting a forum outside Missouri that are unfair or unreasonable”); but see High Life Sales Co. 
v. Brown-Forman Corp., 823 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. 1992) (joining “the better-reasoned majority 
rule” and enforcing forum selection clauses, “so long as doing so is neither unfair nor unreasona-
ble”). 
 448.  See Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240, 1245–46 (Mont. 1998). 
 449.  MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-708, 27-5-323 (2013). 
 450.  Keystone, 971 P.2d at 1245–46. 
 451.  Id. at 1245. 
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tration clauses and forum-selection clauses in contracts generally.
452
 
Following Concepcion, some courts have continued to invalidate fo-
rum selection clauses requiring the plaintiff to arbitrate in far-flung juris-
dictions.  For instance, in Willis v. Nationwide Debt Settlement Group,
453
 
the court refused to enforce a forum-selection clause in an arbitration 
agreement on the following basis: 
It is fair to conclude on this record that Plaintiffs are not capable of paying for 
and participating in arbitration in San Joaquin County, California, and, there-
fore, that enforcement of the forum-selection provision would effectively deny 
Plaintiffs of a meaningful day in court.  In addition, the Court finds this forum-
selection provision was against the strong public policy in Oregon against en-
forcement of forum-selection provisions requiring consumers to assert claims 
relating to consumer contracts in another forum.
454
 
Cases like Willis and Keystone are likely not on firm footing after 
Concepcion because they do not acknowledge that forum selection 
clauses serve many pro-arbitration ends.  Most notably, these clauses 
may drive down total costs and ensure the greatest expertise among those 
involved in the arbitration proceedings.  It is well known that certain ma-
jor cities are financial hubs and therefore centers of arbitration.  Industry-
related expertise may be considered by the parties to be a requirement in 
many arbitrations; a forum selection clause can have the benefit of des-
ignating a forum home to arbitrators experienced in the relevant field.  
Indeed, the Court in Concepcion noted this advantage, stating that “[t]he 
point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is 
to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dis-
pute.  It can be specified, for example, that the decisionmaker be a spe-
cialist in the relevant field . . . .”
455
  It takes no great leap, for example, to 
presume that the parties in Keystone would have had many more arbitra-
tors from which to choose in California, the forum specified by contract, 
than Montana, to resolve their breach of contract dispute. 
Another benefit of forum selection clauses, as the Supreme Court 
recognized in Carnival Cruise Lines, is that they may allow the drafter—
a repeat player—to focus its legal expertise to a single forum, thereby 
                                                          
 452.  See id. (“Montana law, therefore, does not distinguish between forum selection clauses 
which are part of contracts generally and forum selection clauses found in agreements to arbitrate.  
Such a distinction, if one existed, would certainly manifest the kind of unequal treatment that Casa-
rotto prohibits.  The lack of such a distinction is evidence that the statute does not conflict with the 
FAA.”). 
 453.  878 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Or. 2012). 
 454.  Id. at 1221 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 81.150(2) (2008)).   
 455.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (emphasis added). 
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enabling it to offer better contractual terms overall.
456
  Delaware, for in-
stance, has a highly-developed corporate law regime that offers a busi-
ness-drafter more predictability, and thus allows it to economize on other 
costs, such as consumer services.  This concern is especially heightened 
where the drafter has contracted with counterparties that reside in many 
different jurisdictions.  Even the most salient cost of forum selection 
clauses—the cost and time of traveling to the distant and unfamiliar 
home court of the drafter—may have efficiency benefits.  The forum se-
lection clause may prescribe a far-flung forum “in order to avoid formal 
dispute resolution altogether, and the avoidance is valuable to the parties 
in some way.”
457
  Thus, by raising the costs of arbitration, the clause may 
in fact provide an incentive for pre-arbitration dispute resolution, thereby 
lowering costs overall. 
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONCEPCION: FEDERAL LAW 
Following Concepcion, courts are suddenly faced with two seeming-
ly conflicting bodies of law.  The first is Concepcion and its progeny, 
which invalidate rules that conflict with “the fundamental attributes of 
arbitration,”
458
 even if such rules are necessary to ensure that small dollar 
claims are pursued.  The second is Mitsubishi and Randolph, which have 
been broadly construed to establish a federal common law prohibiting 
arbitration where so doing would thwart the “vindication of federal statu-
tory rights.”
459
  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Ex-
press heavily tips the scales in favor of Concepcion, loosening another 




At first blush, one might think that Concepcion has little to say about 
conflicts among federal laws.  After all, Concepcion was rooted in a con-
flict between the FAA and state law, and was decided on obstacle 
                                                          
 456.  See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991) (“[P]assengers who 
purchase tickets containing a forum clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of re-
duced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be 
sued.”). 
 457.  Erin Ann O’Hara, The Jurisprudence and Politics of Forum-Selection Clauses, 3 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 301, 311 (2002). 
 458.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
 459.  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) 
(“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the 
arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”). 
 460.  See supra notes 180–205 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of Concep-
cion in Am. Express). 
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preemption principles.  That distinction appears to be important.  In the 
federal/state situation, the Supremacy Clause mandates that a court’s task 
is to give effect to federal policy, assuming a conflict exists.  In the fed-
eral/federal situation, a court has no such constitutional mandate.  More-
over, obstacle preemption resolves the conflict determining whether state 
law impedes the purposes and objectives underlying federal law.  Indeed, 
the obstacle preemption analysis is grounded on the premise that Con-
gress sought to eliminate states’ discrimination against arbitration.  Why 
should obstacle preemption principles prevent Congress from discrimi-
nating against arbitration if Congress seeks to do so? 
Despite the dissimilar analytical framework in which Concepcion 
was decided, courts have been grappling with difficult questions about 
Concepcion’s spillover effect on federal statutory and common law re-
strictions on arbitration.  While some courts have held that Concepcion 
has nothing to say about federal common law,
461
 many more concluded 
that Concepcion applied with almost equal force in a federal/federal situ-
ation to displace rules interfering with the informality, efficiency, re-
duced costs, and speed of arbitration.
462
  The Supreme Court’s decision 
in American Express came out decidedly in favor of a broad reading of 
Concepcion, to the point of saying that Concepcion was almost disposi-
tive in a case that had nothing to do with state law preemption.
463
  While 
it may be too soon to say that the federal vindication of rights doctrine is 
dead, courts will struggle to apply the cabined vindication of rights anal-
ysis in an effective manner in the post-Concepcion, post-American Ex-
press world. 
                                                          
 461.  See, e.g., Raniere v. Citigroup Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding 
that Concepcion “addressed only whether a state law rule . . . was preempted by the FAA,” which 
“in no way alters” decisions based on “federal arbitral law”), rev’d on different grounds, 2013 WL 
4046278 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2013). 
 462.  See, e.g., Coneff v. AT & T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Although 
Plaintiffs argue that the claims at issue in this case cannot be vindicated effectively because they are 
worth much less than the cost of litigating them, the Concepcion majority rejected that premise.”); 
Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 12CV418 AJB (NLS), 2012 WL 1965337, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 
May 31, 2012) (citing Concepcion’s finding that unrelated policy concerns such as lack of incentive 
for customers to vindicate their rights “cannot undermine the FAA” while rejecting plaintiff’s argu-
ment that courts may only require the arbitration of statutory rights if litigants have the financial 
means to effectively vindicate those rights); Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc.,  879 F. Supp. 2d 
1038, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court clarified that any distinction from Concepcion 
based upon state law versus federal ‘substantive law of arbitrability’ was not viable.” (quoting In re 
Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 2012))). 
 463.  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) (“Truth to tell, 
our decision in [Concepcion] all but resolves this case.”). 
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A. Consequences for Federal Law Hostile to Arbitration 
Concepcion largely has undermined the vindication of statutory 
rights rationale as it relates to state law claims, because a state law may 
“conflict with the FAA even if it is desirable for unrelated purposes.”
464
  
The Court in American Express showed its distaste for this federal com-
mon law principle that “originated as dictum” and which, on several pre-
vious occasions, the Court “declined to apply . . . to invalidate the arbi-
tration agreement at issue.”
465
  More significant than this rhetoric, 
however, American Express appears to have substantially limited this 
principle’s application in the federal context as well. 
The plaintiff in American Express had argued that an arbitration 
clause was not enforceable because the cost of pursuing its federal anti-
trust claim without a class action would indisputably cost more than any 
potential recovery, and thus, under Mitsubishi and Randolph, the plaintiff 
could not vindicate its federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.
466
  
The Court soundly rejected the argument, reasoning that “the fact that it 
is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not 
constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”
467
  Even 
for federal claims, then, “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration 




The Court thus appears to have limited the effective vindication 
principle to the facts of Mitsubishi and Randolph.  Mitsubishi only ad-
dressed the specific situation when “choice-of-forum and choice-of-law 
clauses operate[] in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to 
pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations . . . .”
469
  And, in Ran-
dolph, the Court merely addressed the issue whether a claimant could 
“effectively vindicat[e] her federal statutory rights” given her allegation 
that she risked “large arbitration costs,” i.e., a filing fee, arbitrator fee, 
and other administrative fees, by bringing a claim in arbitration.
470
  
While American Express reiterated the federal vindication of rights prin-
ciple, the Court extrapolated from Mitsubishi only that an arbitration 
                                                          
 464.  See supra notes 298–456 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Concepcion on 
state law).  
 465.  Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
 466.  Id. 
 467.  Id. at 2311. 
 468.  Id. at 2312 n.5. 
 469.  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).  
 470.  Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 & n.6 (2000). 
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agreement could not expressly “forbid” or “eliminate” a party’s right to 
pursue a federal statutory remedy.
471
  The Court even left open the ques-
tion of whether Randolph had continuing validity by noting that “per-
haps” the filing and administrative fees of arbitration could be “so high 
as to make access to the forum impracticable.”
472
  In other words, the ef-
fective vindication doctrine as articulated in American Express protects 
the right to pursue a federal claim, but not to ensure that pursuing the 
claim is “worth the expense.”
473
 
In deciding whether these federal common law principles remain vi-
able post-Concepcion, one must remember that Concepcion is part of a 
larger trend under which contrary federal laws trump the FAA only if 
those laws present an “irreconcilable conflict” with the purposes of the 
FAA.
474
  Thus, at the same time that the Court increasingly requires ex-
press contractual or statutory authority to deviate from the ideals of the 
FAA, the Court has been marginalizing the force of the common law ef-
fective vindication of rights doctrine. 
Just a year before Concepcion, the Court in Stolt-Nielsen vacated an 
arbitration award because the arbitrator “manifestly disregarded” the law 
by allowing class actions when the agreement was “silent” on that issue, 
i.e., in the absence of express contractual authority.
475
  Echoing the sub-
sequent discussion in Concepcion, the Court held that because class ac-
tion procedures fundamentally “change[] the nature of arbitration,” they 
could not have been implicit in the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.
476
  In 
other words, Stolt-Nielsen appears to have expanded the meaning of 
“manifest disregard of the law” even to preclude arbitral decisions that 
conflict with what the Court considers the fundamental attributes of arbi-
tration (and thus conflict with the FAA), absent unmistakably clear in-
tent of the parties. 
Just as the FAA’s policies control if the parties have not clearly spo-
ken on an issue, so too do the FAA’s policies control absent unmistaka-
bly clear congressional intent.  In January 2012, in CompuCredit Corpo-
ration v. Greenwood,
477
 the Court held that the Credit Repair 
                                                          
 471.  See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310–11 (“[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense in-
volved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of  the right to pursue that 
remedy.”). 
 472.  Id. (citing Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90). 
 473.  Id. at 2311. 
 474.  Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 239 (1987); see also Randolph v. 
Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala., 244 F.3d 814, 818 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 475.  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010). 
 476.  Id. at 685. 
 477.  132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
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Organizations Act (CROA) does not preclude arbitration because “the 
CROA is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbi-
trable forum . . . .”
478
  This, in spite of the CROA’s mandate that a credit 
repair organization disclose the following: “You have a right to sue a 
credit repair organization that violates the Credit Repair Organization 
Act.”
479
  Thus, CompuCredit and Stolt-Nielsen provide clear support for 
one court’s recent holding that the CROA does not authorize class arbi-
trations, despite certain provisions in the CROA such as right to punitive 
damages in class actions and the CROA’s non-waiver provision which 
states that “‘any waiver’ of ‘any protection provided by’ the Act is 
void . . . .”
480
  The Supreme Court did suggest in dicta, however, that ex-




American Express took another clear step in this direction.  Citing 
CompuCredit, the Court stated that the FAA compelled the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements for disputes that raise federal claims, “unless 
the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional 
command.’”
482
  In other words, the Court requires Congress to clearly 
evince its intent to deviate from the FAA’s policies or the fundamental 
attributes of arbitration, even in passing other federal statutes in the pur-
suit of other federal policies.  The Court first considered whether Con-
gress had clearly spoken on the issue in American Express, i.e., whether 
the antitrust laws showed Congress’s intention to preclude a waiver of a 
class action procedure in antitrust claims; but as is often the case (espe-
cially with statutes passed well before the modern age of consumer arbi-
tration), no Congressional language on point was found.
483
  Admittedly, 
the Court stated that its “finding of no ‘contrary congressional command’ 
                                                          
 478.  Id. at 673. 
 479.  15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) (2012). 
 480.  King v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., No. 3:11-CV-00068, 2012 WL 5570624, at *9 
(W.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2012).   
 481.  See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 672 (2012) (noting federal statutes 
that expressly override the FAA’s presumption in favor of arbitration); see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) 
(2012) (“No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires 
arbitration of a dispute arising under this section.”); 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2012) (“Notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, whenever a motor vehicle franchise contract provides for the use of 
arbitration to resolve a controversy arising out of or relating to such contract, arbitration may be used 
to settle such controversy only if after such controversy arises all parties to such controversy consent 
in writing to use arbitration to settle such controversy.”); cf. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012) (granting 
authority to the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to regulate predispute arbitra-
tion agreements in contracts for consumer financial products or services). 
 482.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (quoting Compu-
Credit, 132 S. Ct. at 668–69). 
 483.  Id. at 2309–10. 
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does not end the case.”
484
  But by so narrowly construing the effective 
vindication principle as to prevent an arbitration agreement that flatly 
“forbids” or “eliminates” the assertion of a federal statutory right, but not 
the myriad other devices that could have the same effect,
485
 for all intents 




Considering the Court’s push to permit deviation from the FAA’s 
purposes in the federal context only when there is clear contractual or 
statutory authority to support it, it is no wonder that the American Ex-
press majority was loath to apply the “judge-made” effective vindication 
principle to deviate from the “fundamental attributes of arbitration.”
487
  
Given the level of statutory specificity required to deviate from such ide-
als under CompuCredit and the minimal protections afforded by the ef-
fective vindication principle under American Express, courts facing a po-
tential conflict among federal laws will, as a default, pursue the purposes 
of the FAA to the detriment of other federal goals in the absence of con-
gressional action. 
B. Recurring Federal Conflicts Issues 
1. Class-Wide Arbitration 
Consistent with Randolph and Mitsubishi, a number of federal cir-
cuits have held that class action waivers could be invalidated if they pre-
vented a prospective litigant from vindicating his or her federal cause of 
action.
488
  However, after Concepcion and more clearly in American Ex-
press, class arbitration cannot be required in the absence of express con-
gressional authorization.
489
  One might argue that class arbitration could 
                                                          
 484.  Id. at 2310. 
 485.  See id. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing various examples of “alternatives” to “baldly 
exculpatory provisions” that “would have the identical effect”). 
 486.  Id. at 2310–11. 
 487.  Id. at 2310, 2312. 
 488.  See, e.g., In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f a par-
ty could demonstrate that the prohibition on class actions likely would make arbitration prohibitively 
expensive, such a showing could invalidate an agreement.” (citation omitted)); Livingston v. Assocs. 
Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003) (“In the present case, the [plaintiffs] have not offered 
any specific evidence of arbitration costs that they may face in this litigation, prohibitive or other-
wise, and have failed to provide any evidence of their inability to pay such costs . . . .”); Adkins v. 
Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[Lead plaintiff] makes no showing of the 
specific financial status of any of the plaintiffs at the time this action was brought.  He provides no 
basis for a serious estimation of how much money is at stake for each individual plaintiff.”). 
 489.  Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (“No contrary congressional command requires us to re-
ject the waiver of class arbitration here.”). 
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be required in certain circumstances under the effective vindication prin-
ciple, even after American Express.  We address this argument in the 
next section. 
2. Prohibitive Arbitration Costs 
Outside the class action context, courts have held under Mitsubishi 
and Randolph that prohibitive arbitration costs may prevent a party from 
effectively vindicating his federal statutory rights in arbitration, thereby 
rendering an arbitration agreement or some part thereof unenforceable.
490
  
On the “costs” side of the ledger, courts have considered whether filing 
fees, arbitrator fees, and other administrative fees, as well as attorneys’ 
fee splitting clauses, result in prohibitive costs.
491
  On the income side of 
the ledger, courts would consider evidence of the party’s salary or other 
assets.  Similarly, a party seeking to bring a claim as a member of a class 
could argue that the costs of bringing bilateral arbitration are so high as 
to also have the effect of preventing the vindication of the party’s federal 
statutory rights. 
American Express left open the question whether a Randolph-type 
claim that prohibitive arbitration costs, like “filing and administrative 
fees,” continue to serve as a basis for invalidating an arbitration agree-
ment under the effective vindication principle.
492
  However, the Court re-
jected the plaintiff’s claim that it could not vindicate its federal rights be-
cause the cost of pursuing an antitrust claim in bilateral arbitration 
exceeded any potential recovery, on the grounds that “the fact that it is 
not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not 
constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”
493
  This 
reasoning just as readily would appear to undermine a claim that the fil-
ing and other administrative fees of arbitration exceed the cost of recov-
ery.  One must bear certain administrative costs to file suit in court as in 
arbitration, and small value claims may not be worth the expense of pur-
                                                          
 490.  See, e.g., Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2004) (requiring party 
seeking to avoid arbitration in ADEA case to present “specific evidence of likely arbitrators’ fees,” 
as defined by contract or estimated by reference to the issues in the case and arbitrator costs); Spinet-
ti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (considering filing fees, other administrative 
fees, and arbitrator fees in determining whether arbitration costs would be prohibitively expensive); 
see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90–92 (2000).   
 491.  Id. at 90 n.6. 
 492.  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013) (citing 
Randolph, 531 U.S. at 90) (writing that “perhaps” the effective vindication principle would cover 
such fees when they are “so high as to make access to the forum impracticable”). 
 493.  Id. at 2311 (citation omitted). 
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suing the remedy.  In any event, American Express, citing Concepcion, 
held that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps 
any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims,” whether 
grounded in state or federal law.
494
  Therefore, irrespective whether a 
party seeks to bring a claim as a member of a class, we do not expect a 
Randolph-type prohibitive arbitration costs argument to succeed to either 
prevent the enforcement of a class action waiver, or the arbitration clause 
as a whole. 
3. Limits on Statutory Damages 
Judicial decisions invalidating agreements to limit a claimant’s rights 
to damages under its federal statutory cause of action
495
 would likely re-
main valid after Concepcion.  Of course, class action arbitrations and the 
availability of statutory damages are similar in a key way—both are fre-
quently necessary to give claimants sufficient incentive to prosecute their 
claims.  That being so, the availability of statutory damages remain with-
in the core holding of Mitsubishi that restrictions on statutory damages 
under the Sherman Act would be invalid to the extent that they defeated 
the remedial purposes of that law. 
Additionally, American Express framed the effective vindication 
principle in terms of whether the challenged contract language acts as a 
“prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.”
496
  A 
clause attempting to limit federal statutory damages would, at a mini-
mum, directly interfere with a party’s statutory remedies, and depending 
on the contract language, could operate as a prospective waiver of such 
remedies in entirety.  Any such contract language would almost certainly 
run squarely into a “contrary congressional command.”  Furthermore, it 
is not evident how limiting damages serves the procedural ends of arbi-
tration by lowering costs, decreasing formality, or increasing efficiency, 
which were touted as the fundamental attributes of arbitration under 
Concepcion’s reasoning.  Until the Court overrules Mitsubishi, the deci-
                                                          
 494.  Id. at 2311. 
 495.  Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2006) (striking down arbitration 
clause that precluded award of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party granted by federal and 
state statutes); Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding 
arbitration agreement unenforceable where claimant forfeited (a) statutory rights to exemplary dam-
ages; (b) statutory rights to attorneys’ fees; and (c) the more generous statute of limitations provided 
by law); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding an 
arbitration agreement unenforceable where it defeated the basic remedial purposes of Title VII). 
 496.  Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,  637 n.19 (1985) (emphasis added). 
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sion still controls,
497
 and neither the language nor logic of Concepcion 
and American Express suggest that contractual limitations on federal 
statutory damages will be upheld. 
4. Restrictions on the Statute of Limitations 
By contrast, agreements providing for shorter statutes of limitations 
for federal claims may present a closer call.  Many federal statutes ex-
pressly draft generous limitations periods for the benefit of civil plain-
tiffs.  Limiting these periods may prevent the effective vindication of 
statutory rights.  However, narrowing the statute of limitations promotes 
repose, reduces litigation costs, discourages evidence from becoming 
stale, reduces uncertainty, and improves the overall efficiency of dispute 
resolution.
498
  Moreover, invalidating agreements shortening limitations 
periods may disproportionately affect arbitration, thus presenting the bi-
ased application of generally applicable principles that the Concepcion 
majority mentioned.  Thus, certain contractual restrictions on the statute 
of limitations may continue to be invalid, as some courts have held.
499
 
5. Impartiality and Lack of Mutuality 
Under pre-Concepcion federal common law, courts invalidated one-
sided arbitration agreements containing egregiously unfair rules or oth-
erwise lacking mutuality, citing Randolph and Mitsubishi.
500
  As men-
tioned at the beginning of this Article, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Hooters is a particularly illustrative example of an arbitration agreement 
that was invalid under pre-Concepcion and pre-Randolph regimes due to 
the panoply of rules the Fourth Circuit considered one-sided. 
In Hooters, the court invalidated an agreement between Hooters and 
                                                          
 497.  See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 216 (1997). 
 498.  See generally Tyler Ochoa & Andrew Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Lim-
itation, 28 PAC. L. J. 453 (1997) (exploring the policy considerations supporting statutes of limita-
tion).  
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6115055, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 10, 2012) (“Because the one-year limitation period contravenes the 
limitation of Title VII, the one-year limitation significantly diminishes a party’s rights under Title 
VII.  Defendant has agreed to waive the one-year limitation period.  However, the Court finds that 
the one-year limitation period significantly diminishes plaintiff’s statutory rights and is therefore 
unenforceable.” (citations omitted)). 
 500.  Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 
2002) (holding that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the agreement drafted by 
the employer “placed control over the selection of the single arbitrator for employment disputes in 
the hands of [the] employer”); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1999).   
 
484 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
its employee, which included the following provisions regarding arbitra-
tion: the employee was required to identify its legal and factual claims 
with specificity (including providing a list of its witnesses and testimo-
ny), but Hooters was free not to file any responsive pleadings, or provide 
notice of its defenses or witnesses; only Hooters could arbitrate matters 
not raised in the employee’s claim; only Hooters could move for sum-
mary dismissal before a hearing; Hooters exercised complete control of 
creating the record of the proceedings; and finally, only Hooters could 
cancel the arbitration agreement with thirty days’ notice, or seek vacatur 
of the award.  The court concluded that “[t]he Hooters rules when taken 
as a whole, however, are so one-sided that their only possible purpose is 
to undermine the neutrality of the proceeding.”
501
  One may justify the 
continuing viability of Hooters on the ground that the arbitration agree-
ment at issue was so fundamentally unfair that it was incompatible with 
“fundamental attributes of arbitration.” 
Surprisingly, there is even a plausible case that Hooters may no 
longer be valid after Concepcion, despite its unusual facts.  First, Hooters 
did not find that the arbitration agreement would undermine the plain-
tiff’s federal statutory cause of action nor did the court apply the “effec-
tive vindication of statutory rights” test.  Rather, the court pegged its 
analysis to Hooters’ obligation to perform its contractual duty in “good 
faith,” which purportedly entailed the “faithfulness to an agreed common 
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other par-
ty.”
502
  To the extent that Randolph and Mitsubishi are the exclusive ba-
ses under federal common law to strike down arbitration agreements, and 
to the extent that those cases are limited to their facts, it arguably would 
be improper to rely on policy reasons grounded on the inchoate obliga-
tion to act in “good faith.” 
Second, it could be argued that striking down the agreement would 
impede the purposes underlying the FAA.  Requiring the employee to set 
forth his or her claim with specificity allows the employer to assess 
whether it will be necessary to fight the claim or proceed to settlement—
relieving one party of discovery and pleading obligations and reducing 
costs.  Allowing one party to select the arbitrator improves efficiency by, 
for example, eliminating the possibility that both parties fight over arbi-
trator selection.  Finally, invalidating agreements due to a lack of mutual-
ity and “good faith” might be used disproportionately against arbitration 
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agreements, just as California courts have done in applying state uncon-
scionability law. Should this happen, mutuality-based reasoning would 
likely become incompatible with the anti-discrimination prong of FAA 
preemption analysis.  However, to the extent that such arguments might 
be made, at present, the courts are continuing to apply the principles set 




V. CONCLUSION: CONCEPCION CONCEPTUALIZED 
This Article has systematically considered Concepcion’s effect on 
state and federal restrictions on the arbitration process.  Unlike several 
commentators, we conclude that Concepcion’s effects are far-ranging in 
several dimensions. 
First, under the most objective interpretation of Concepcion, the 
FAA preempts any state law that (1) prohibits outright the arbitration of a 
particular type of claim; (2) violates the FAA’s anti-discrimination prin-
ciple when the rule is more likely to be applied in a manner disfavoring 
arbitration; or (3) interferes with “fundamental attributes of arbitra-
tion”—informality, efficiency, reduced costs, and speed. 
Second, Concepcion invalidates prior decisions that the FAA does 
not preempt certain state rules.  In light of the three-prong test described 
in this Article, and taking Concepcion’s reasoning at face value, the like-
ly effect of Concepcion is as follows: 
 
 The FAA may, as a general matter, preempt any type of state 
procedural law, and it is immaterial whether the law is clas-
sified as “procedural” or “substantive.” 
 The FAA preempts inconsistent state arbitration acts that 
regulate appeals from orders compelling or denying arbitra-
tion. 
 The FAA preempts rules purporting to establish a discovery 
baseline, irrespective of whether the parties agreed to a dif-
ferent discovery baseline in arbitration. 
 The FAA now preempts rules interfering with the confiden-
tiality of arbitration proceedings. 
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 The FAA preempts a greater number of rules that regulate 
the manner in which the parties may split costs. 
 The FAA preempts a greater number of rules that regulate 
the forum in which arbitration may take place. 
 Unconscionability as a defense still survives, but it is unclear 
what, if any, practical power it now has. 
 
Third, Concepcion, as that decision was interpreted in American Ex-
press, pares back the federal policy grounds for refusing to arbitrate, in-
cluding those rationales arising from the penumbras in Randolph and 
Mitsubishi.  It is very likely that Randolph and Mitsubishi, while not 
overruled, are now greatly restricted in their application.  And more than 
that, there is an exceedingly plausible case that state courts may not use 
Randolph and Mitsubishi to find arbitration agreements unconscionable 
under state law. 
Finally, Concepcion may shift future litigation to a more fundamen-
tal—but to date unexplored—discussion of what arbitration “is” and 
whether our current understandings of arbitration are susceptible to evo-
lution.  As arbitration increasingly displaces litigation as the preferred 
method of dispute resolution, the “fundamental attributes of arbitration” 
will hopefully draw more careful attention from courts and commenta-
tors alike.  Until that day arrives, the Supreme Court has spoken, and a 
tectonic shift in the law is now underway. 
 
 
